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I. INTRODUCTION1
Technological developments in the information society
bring new challenges, both to the applicability and to the enforceability of the law. One major challenge is posed by new entities such as pseudonyms, avatars, and software agents that operate at an increasing distance from the physical persons
“behind” them (the “principal”). In case of accidents or misbehavior, current laws require that the physical or legal principal
behind the entity be found so that she can be held to account.
This may be problematic if the linkability of the principal and
the operating entity is questionable.
In case of a pseudonym, for example an eBay account, the
physical person who uses the pseudonym is legally responsible;
however, the law too often becomes useless because it is hard to
enforce legal rights. Indeed, it can be difficult or impossible to
discover the link between the physical person and her pseudonym. In the case of a software agent, who is the person responsible—the agent’s programmer, its seller, or its user? What
happens if the software agent adapts itself and learns from its
environment so that it eventually behaves in an intrinsically
unpredictable way? Is it then still meaningful to find a physical
person or another entity with legal personhood who is accountable for the behavior of this software agent?
One solution to this problem has been much discussed in
the literature: could or should we attribute legal personhood to
such entities so that they can be legally addressed themselves?
Attributing personhood to non-human entities is not as strange
as it might seem at first sight. In most modern legal systems,
legal personhood is attributed to associations, funds, or even
ships, even if this is never full personhood in the sense of an
entitlement to claim the entire range of human rights and liberties.2 In principle the law can attribute conditional legal
1. This article was written as part of the EU-funded project FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society), http://www.fidis.net. It builds on
previous work in which we co-operated with Harald Zwingelberg,
Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz, Kiel, Germany, whom we
thank for his help in this research. We also thank Ronald Leenes of Tilburg
University for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
2. See, e.g., Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95
CAL. L. REV. 513, 522 (2007) (noting that corporations and ships have standing
to sue on the basis of their own injury); Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?,
in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS at 251, 260–61
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personhood to any well-defined type of entity. Clearly, this does
not imply that we can simply give legal personhood to avatars
or software agents. The law has a respectable tradition in flexibly incorporating social and technological developments in its
system. New conditions created by new paradigms often have
been interpreted successfully in terms of the existing legal
framework. At the same time, we also see that when this interpretation becomes too difficult or too costly to maintain, the legal system has proven itself dynamic enough to move along
with new paradigms: new legal constructions or even new legal
entities have been created. For example, legal personhood has
been granted to non-human entities, such as companies, trust
funds, and states.
Now, when an action or a transaction is realized with the
help of an intermediate acting entity, and when this action or
transaction cannot be linked to the person who is legally responsible today, what are possible solutions to make the law
applicable and enforceable? Can current laws comfortably incorporate the new entities, or do we need to use the dynamism
of the legal system to create new legal constructions or even
new legal persons?
This issue has been discussed in the literature for almost
two decades. Since Lawrence Solum’s landmark article Legal
Personhood for Artificial Intelligences,3 technologies have considerably advanced, new entities like avatars have emerged,
and the literature has moved along. Recently, an important addition to the literature has been published in German— a dissertation by Andreas Matthias, which may not yet be familiar
to the English-language community.4 In light of the ongoing
(Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (“Congress is frequently
permitted to create juridical persons and to allow them to bring suit in their
own right. Corporations are the most obvious example. But plaintiffs need not
be expressly labeled ‘persons,’ juridical or otherwise, and legal rights are also
given to trusts, municipalities, partnerships, and even ships . . . .”); Laurence
H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the
Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 2–3
(2001) (“[T]he truth is that even our existing legal system . . . has long recognized rights in entities other than individual human beings. Churches, partnerships, corporations, unions, families, municipalities, even states are rightsholders indeed, we sometimes classify them as legal persons for a wide range
of purposes . . . .”).
3. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C.L. REV. 1231 (1992).
4. Andreas Matthias, Automaten als Träger von Rechten. Plädoyer für
eine Gesetzänderung (2007) (dissertation, Humboldt Universität).
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developments in electronic agents, there is sufficient reason to
conduct a review of the literature in order to more closely examine arguments for an against legal personhood for some nonhuman acting entities. This article will also include a discussion of alternative approaches to solving the “accountability
gap.” We aim to answer the following research questions:
1. Given the rise of new types of acting entities in the information society that operate at increasing distance from the
persons who employ them, is current law sufficiently equipped
to deal with potential conflicts, or would it help to create (limited) legal personhood for some of these new types of acting
entities in some contexts?
2. Under which conditions would non-human entities qualify for the attribution of liability based on culpable and wrongful action and under which conditions could such entities claim
(post)human rights and liberties?
Given the generic nature of these questions, we focus on
law in general rather than on specific legal systems, and we do
not aim at providing a definitive answer to this question. Rather, we give various perspectives from common-law and continental traditions that are relevant for answering these questions in order to come to a tentative conclusion on which future
research can build. In Part II, we introduce the challenge of
various entities operating at increasing distance from their users and, in Part III,we clarify the concepts of persons, agents,
and autonomy. Next, in Part IV, we provide an extensive review of literature on the topic of rights for non-humans, from
the landmark analysis of Solum to recent literature from Germany. After distinguishing between various types of personhood and agency that emerge from this review in Part V, we
answer the research question by outlining a three-stage strategy for the short, middle, and long term in Part VI.
II. FACING THE CHALLENGE: EMERGING ENTITIES IN
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
A. PSEUDONYMS
The term “pseudonym” comes from the Greek word pseudonumon which means false name.5 Traditionally, a pseu5. PSEUDONYM, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 482 (Warner Books ed. 1987).
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donym was a fictitious name taken by an author.6 For example,
Voltaire and Molière are pseudonyms of famous French writers.
Today, pseudonyms often are used by artists, especially in show
business, to mask their official identity. In this case, a pseudonym can be seen as a self-chosen name that becomes an identity in the artistic context. In some situations, the pseudonym
is used to conceal the true identity of the person, acting as a
privacy-enhancing tool.7 Pseudonyms also function as user IDs
in the information society. On the Internet, many people use a
pseudonym (or multiple pseudonyms) to stay anonymous.8 Although pseudonyms have a more instrumental, passive nature
than the software agents and robots discussed below, they do
have a certain independent function because they shield the
persons behind them. In a functional sense, the pseudonyms
“do business” on behalf of the persons they shield. From this
perspective, they constitute an entity in their own right, and it
is this abstract role that makes them a category to consider in
our discussion of new entities in the information society.9 For
practical reasons, in this article we will use the term “pseudonym” as a proxy for the abstract entity that is represented by
the pseudonym.
When a pseudonym is functioning as a mask between a
human person and the outside world, the pseudonym can acquire a personality of its own and operate at some distance
from the person it shields. This is particularly the case when
the pseudonym is a mask shared by more than one person, so

6. Id.
7. FUTURE OF IDENTITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, D 2.13: VIRTUAL
PERSONS AND IDENTITIES 24 (David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle ed., 2008), available
at
http://www.fidis.net/filefilea/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp2del2.13_Virtual_PersonP_v1.0.pdf.
8. Id.
9. This is in line with the approach proposed by a model based on virtual
persons, developed in David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle et al., Virtual Persons
and Identities, in THE FUTURE OF IDENTITIY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 75
(Kai Rannenberg et al., eds., 2009). In this model, a pseudonym can be seen as
the identity—and identifier—of a virtual person, which is a special type of abstract entity. According to this model, the pseudonym is the tautological identity of its corresponding abstract entity: by definition, it identifies this abstract
entity. In other words, the pseudonym represents an abstract entity that is
identified by the pseudonym. For example, George Eliot—a pseudonym used
by Victorian author Mary Anne Evans—identifies the abstract entity called
George Eliot. This abstract entity does not exist as a person of flesh and bone,
but is a virtual person known to many as, for example, the author of Middlemarch.
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that it functions relatively independently from the specific human beings behind it. A clear example of this is the pseudonyms used on eBay, which allows users to interact with each
other using user IDs.10
Mechanisms can be developed to deal efficiently, securely,
and directly with the pseudonym itself rather than the individual using this pseudonym. Payment procedures and reputation
on eBay are good examples. Ebay sellers can offer payment
through the service PayPal,11 which does not divulge buyers’
credit card or other information to the seller. Therefore, the
buyer need only trust PayPal (not the seller himself anymore)
not to misuse his credit card information. Reputation is a key
component when building trust. PayPal, for example, may be
trusted more than other escrow services in particular because it
has a strong implicit positive reputation, just by being the preferred payment method for most eBay buyers and sellers. The
eBay platform provides a reputation system that allows building trust between eBay users who do not know each other, who
have never interacted together and who are hidden behind
pseudonyms.12 To each eBay user ID is attached a so-called
“feedback profile”. The feedback profile of an eBay user ID
measures the concordance between the actual behavior of this
eBay user ID during his previous transactions and the expected
behavior of this eBay user ID, according to other users who
have already taken part into these transactions. The eBay reputation system is fed by users themselves. It collects experiences of previous eBay transaction partners.13
For acceptance in commercial and legal practice, the ability
to “de-anonymize” is currently an important attribute of pseudonyms. A pseudonym is “de-anonymizable” when the information that provides the link to the physical person can be disclosed upon request under a defined set of situations, such as
when a contractual party does not comply with its duties. Such
disclosures, as well as the control over the requirements of a

10. See Choosing a User ID, http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/userid.html (last visited May 2, 2010).
11. About Us, https://www.paypal-media.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited
May 2, 2010).
12. See
All
About
Feedback,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/allaboutfeedback.html (last visited May 2,
2010).
13. Id.
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disclosure, may be handled by a trusted third party, called a
linkability broker. Such a broker needs to be in possession of
the identifying information in order to match the pseudonym
with the name of the holder.
In trade and privacy law, trust is a crucial factor influencing the potential use of pseudonyms. Pseudonymous transactions may likely be accepted in cases of an immediate performance, but in cases where payment and performance are not
simultaneous, the seller needs to trust that payment will follow
and the product or service will be delivered. Some technical and
organizational solutions like PayPal may be available for enhancing trust in these cases. However, before pseudonymous
transactions can really flourish, more trust-enhancing mechanisms will need to be developed and implemented.14
B. AVATARS
Avatars are entities featured in computer games and other
online environments like Second Life.15 Such digital avatars
represent the player in the game world of Multi User Dungeons
(MUDs), Multi User Virtual Environments (MUVEs), Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) and
other computer games, collectively referred to as “virtual
games.”16 The term avatar does not only refer to threedimensional representations in virtual games, but also to the
icons representing a specific user in an online forum or any
other graphical representation of a computer user.17 For our
purposes, an avatar is a virtual person representing one or
more players in the physical world or even a computer program.
Engaging in a virtual game usually starts with the creation
of a personalized avatar by adjusting the appearance of the
graphical representation on the screen by choosing skin, facial
features, and clothes. In many games, particularly role playing
14. See generally Jacquet-Chiffelle et al., supra note 9; TRUST IN
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: THE ROLE OF TRUST FROM A LEGAL,
ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE (J.E.J. Prins et al. eds., 2002).
15. See What is Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/?lang=en-US
(last accessed May 2, 2010).
16. See Virtual world – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_world (last accessed May 2, 2010).
17. Avatar (computing) – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avatar_%28computing%29 (last accessed May 2,
2010).
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games, further attributes such as strength, dexterity and abilities such as swimming, climbing or pickpocketing can be assigned to further personalize the avatar.18 In many role playing
games advancement and development of the avatar is a central
aspect of the game play. Guiding an avatar in its advancement
over a long period of time and individualizing the avatar with
one’s own preferences or getting absorbed by the interaction
with other avatars forges a tight relationship between the player and his avatar.19
As having an advanced avatar makes the game play more
enjoyable, the demand for well-developed avatars and their increasingly powerful possessions creates a market for virtual
goods. Depending on the game publishers’ terms of service,
such a market may be allowed or even intended, may be limited
to in-game trade, or may be forbidden. Increasingly, publishers
allow and encourage the transfer of avatars between players.
The increased market value of virtual items gave rise to legal
discussions and has even led to first legal actions brought to
national courts.20
In contrast to some pseudonyms and software agents, avatars are not usually involved in commercial relationships but
rather in leisure contexts. As such, their legal status is relevant
in light of the tight emotional bond which physical persons can
establish with their avatar.21 This raises the question whether,
for example, defamation of an avatar can occur and, if so,
whether it has legal consequences. Based on its prior actions,
an avatar may have a reputation within the virtual world. The
programs and scripts in control of other avatars could refer to
this kind of reputation of the avatar to calculate their response
towards the avatar. Such reputation may even become a factor
affecting the economic value of the avatar in the physical world.
Damaging this reputation could cause a monetary loss for the
player in the physical world, for instance in case he wants to
18. Id.
19. See Nick Yee, The Psychology of Massively Multi-User Online RolePlaying Games: Motivations, Emotional Investment, Relationships and Problematic Usage, in Avatars at Work and Play: Collaboration and Interaction in
Shared Virtual Environments 187, 189–91, 193–94, 196–98 (Ralph Schroeder
&
Ann-Sofie
Axelsson
eds.,
2006),
available
at
http://vhil.stanford.edu/pubs/2006/yee-psychology-mmorpg.pdf.
20. See generally Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.
Pa., 2007) (concerning the sale of a piece of virtual land).
21. See Jacquet-Chiffelle et al., supra note 9, at 96.
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sell his avatar. This subsequently may constitute a tort and
could lead to granting a claim for damages. But in contrast to
reputation, an avatar is not capable of having honor, dignity, or
self-esteem. Consequently this raises the fundamental question
as to what exactly is the object of the protection offered by the
regulations on defamation in different jurisdictions.
C. SOFTWARE AGENTS
In the information society, more and more tasks are facilitated, and indeed increasingly performed, by software. As the
software program becomes more autonomous, we can speak of
software agents,22 sometimes also referred to as electronic
agents, intelligent agents or softbots (software robots).
To illuminate the concept of software agents, it is useful
first to look at the concept of an agent. Generally speaking the
term “agent” refers to: (1)an entity capable of action;23 or (2)
someone (or something) who acts on behalf of another person.24
In the first, most general sense, the class of agents can be
divided into biological agents (such as human beings or viruses)
and non-biological agents, which include both hardware agents
or robots and software agents. All of these agents are capable of
action. If the action is performed on behalf of another entity,
then the agent fits within the second, more restricted, definition—the agent then functions as a representative of another
entity.
If we restrict the notion of action to intentional or autonomous action, not all software qualifies as an agent in the
sense of an entity capable of action. “Software agents are programs that react autonomously to changes in their environment and solve their tasks without any intervention of the user.”25 Because of this characteristic, software agents are
22. See Software agent – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_agent (last accessed May 2, 2010).
23. Cf. Agent – Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/agent (defining an agent as “an active or efficient
cause” or one that exerts power or produces an effect) (last visited Nov. 20,
2009). More interesting for our purpose is Latour’s definition of an actor, “any
thing that [modifies] a state of affairs by making a difference.” BRUNO
LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORKTHEORY 71 (2005).
24. Cf. Agent – Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/agent (defining an agent as” a representative who acts
on behalf of other persons or organizations”).
25. Steffen Wettig & Eberhard Zehendner, A Legal Analysis of Human

KOOPS_MACROS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/10/2010 3:14 PM

BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

507

sometimes also called autonomous agents.26 Note that in this
definition, intention is not required and autonomy is understood in a very general manner that includes actions of agents
that are not aware of their own actions and, thus, cannot be
held morally responsible for them.27
A further distinction can be made between stationary
agents and mobile agents. Stationary agents move only in their
original environment (e.g., their owner’s computer), whereas
mobile agents “move around (migrate) independently in heterogeneous computer networks.”28 Agents can also be classified according to their function. There are basically four types of software agents: user agents (personal assistants); buyer agents
(shopbots); monitoring or surveillance agents; and data mining
agents. 29
User agents are typically stationary and restricted to personal use. As a result, they raise fewer questions about duties
and obligations. Other types of agents, which may be mobile
and more distant from their owners, present more complex issues. In terms of “distance” from their principal, it is also useful to distinguish three types of agents, depending on the degree of autonomy with which they operate. A slave has no
autonomy at all. For any decision that affects the possessions,
legal rights, and obligations of its “master” it has to consult
him. A representative may take its own decisions within a welldefined domain and within strict limits. A salesman may make
its own decisions and is not restricted in the way in which it intends to take care of its user’s interest. It is bound to serve the
interests its user wants to be taken care of. It may for instance
manage a stock portfolio belonging to its user.
and Electronic Agents, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND L. 111, 112 (2004)
[hereinafter Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis].
26. “An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of an
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit
of its own agenda and so as to affect what it senses in the future.” Stan Franklin & Art Graesser, Is it an Agent, or just a Program? A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
ON AGENT THEORIES, ARCHITECTURES, AND LANGUAGES 21–35 (SpringerVerlag 1996). Note that we use the term autonomous in a more restricted
sense, see infra, Part III.B.
27. We shall further explore the nexus of agents, autonomy and personhood in Part III, infra.
28. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 112.
29. Software
agent—Wikipedia,
the
free
encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_agent (last visited May 2, 2010).
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Relatively autonomous software agents are normally related to physical persons, but at a distance. As such agents develop, the time may come when their actions can no longer be
seen as the actions of the human beings behind them. Insofar
as these actions have legal or other consequence, this raises the
issue of whether and to what extent rights and obligations
should be attributed to software agents themselves. This is a
highly relevant question in an information society in which
these agents become increasingly autonomous. Indeed, if we
are to believe Willmott, “[I]t might already be possible to create
wholly independent artificial entities with their own identities,
financial independence and the ability to exist undetected in
online human dominated worlds.”30
D. ROBOTS
Long before the notion of software agents emerged, the
idea of autonomic machines— robots—was already prevalent,
first in fiction and, with slowly increasing sophistication, in reality.31 Karl Čapek introduced the term “robot” in his 1921 play
R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), for servant machines looking like humans.32 Most robots in real life are industrial robots
used, for example, in car and electronics factories, or service
robots like vacuum-cleaning or lawn-mowing machines. These
robots are more than just machines in that they usually have
some sensors for scanning and adapting movements to their
environment.33 They operate without direct human intervention and appear to have some form of agency. Increasingly,
these machines are becoming more autonomic, performing
more complex tasks based on programmed algorithms while
processing multiple sensory input from their environment.
Another type of robots emerging is the pet robot. The Tamagotchi, developed in the 1990s, was a primitive and briefly
popular gadget marketed as a pet.34 Apart from such digital
30. STEVEN WILLMOTT, ILLEGAL AGENTS? CREATING WHOLLY
INDEPENDENT AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES IN ONLINE WORLDS 8 (2004), available
at http://www.lsi.upc.edu/dept/techreps/llistat_detallat.php?id=695.
31. For a good overview, see Robot—Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robot (last visited May 2, 2010).
32. KAREL CAPEK, R.U.R. (ROSSUM’S UNIVERSAL ROBOTS) (Paul Selver
trans.,1925).
33. See,
e.g.,
Roomba-Wikipedia,
the
free
encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roomba (last visited May 2, 2010).
34. Tamagotchi
–
Wikipedia,
the
free
encyclopedia,
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pets, animal-look-alike pets are also being produced. The bestknown pet robot is probably Sony’s Aibo, a robot-dog introduced
in 1999.35 Paro, a robot seal, for example, is popular in Japan
as a pet companion, and he is proposed for therapeutic purposes in hospitals.36
Other types of robots are being developed that begin to look
more and more like humans. One strand of research is developing realistic looking robots that mirror human looks.37 Another
strand looks at distinguishing features that might allow a robot
to create the perception of human qualities, in particular facial
expressions like smiling or raising eyebrows.38 If the humanoid
robot were equipped with artificial intelligence, and thus acquire more autonomy through emergent behavior, we are slowly getting closer to the futuristic vision of an android.39
Because of the huge potential benefits of automating tasks,
the first type of robots (industrial and service) will almost certainly continue to be developed with growing sophistication and
an increasing level of autonomic functioning. The development
of animal and human-looking robots will also move forward,
perhaps with lower levels of autonomic activity than the functional robots because they have a largely social or entertainment function.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamagotchi (last visited May 2, 2010).
35. AIBO, Your Artifical Intelligent Companion, http://support.sonyeurope.com/aibo/ (last visited May 2, 2010).
36. Paro Therapeutic Pet, http://www.parorobots.com/ (last visited May 2,
2010); see also
Canadian Press, Robot Baby Seals to Replace Cats and Dogs as Pets in Hospitals, Nursing Homes, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 12, 2009, available at
http://www.thestar.com/article/569488.
37. See,
for
example,
the
work
of
Hiroshi
Ishiguro
at
http://www.is.sys.es.osaka-u.ac.jp/index.en.html (last visited May 2, 2010).
38. See,
for
example,
MIT’s
Kismet
at
http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/kismet/kismet.html
(last visited May 2, 2010).
39. The best-known example of an android is Data from Star Trek. For
robots to become more intelligent and social, context-sensitivity seems pertinent, which could imply, for example, some form of distributed intelligence
that emerges less from a single robot than from its interconnectivity (online
connections with data bases that allow for data mining the data gathered by
both the robot and other sensors in its environment). This could make it hard
to identify the robot as a physical entity, as its emergent behavior depends on
the entire network of interconnected sensors, and online data bases.
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E. INCREASING DISTANCE
To summarize how new acting entities operate at increasing distance, we propose two open questions that illustrate this
new paradigm and how this creates problems for legal accountability.
The widespread use of persistent pseudonyms on the Internet, for example of an eBay seller or consumer, raises questions about the link between a transaction and the physical
person with whom the transaction is made. How do we deal
with this new reality when, if something goes wrong, no physical person can be linked with a reasonable amount of effort to
the transaction? Even if substantive law provides a clear answer as to who is responsible and who should bear the consequences, which will often but not always be the case with the
entities discussed, can rights be effectively enforced in practice?
New forms of unlawful activities take advantage of the gray
zones, where the law is theoretically applicable but becomes
very hard to enforce in a globalized cyberworld with entities
acting at increasing distance.
In order to assess responsibility, the reason why an action
took place sometimes has to be determined. Was it done, for example, with mens rea? What happens when a non-human entity acts on behalf of a human being, such as when the human
being is only indirectly acting at a considerable distance? Can
non-human entities, like a software agent, be considered to
have their own will and take independent decisions?
III. PERSONS, AGENTS, AND AUTONOMY
The entities discussed above do not prima facie count as
“persons”—a term traditionally associated with human beings.
Yet the legal construct of the non-human legal person shows
that non-human entities can also count as persons in law. Before moving into a discussion of new types of legal persons, it
seems useful to briefly clarify what is meant by “a person,” a
concept that relates to the concepts of agent and agency. These
concepts, in turn, relate to varying degrees of automation and
autonomy, which are also important to distinguish conceptually.
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A. PERSONHOOD AND AGENCY
To provide some conceptual coherence, we may start with
Bruno Latour’s salient depiction of what he calls “actants.”40 An
actant is “any thing that [modifies] a state of affairs by making
a difference. . . .”41 Any thing can thus be an actant in this very
broad sense, depending on whether it does or does not make a
difference. Paraphrasing Peirce’s pragmatist stance on doubt
(one cannot doubt everything, but we should be willing to doubt
anything),42 we could say that it makes no sense to qualify everything as an actant, but we should be willing to qualify anything qualifying as an actant When discussing legal personhood
for non-human actants, the point should be to investigate at
what point it makes sense to attribute legal consequence of the
actants’ actions to the actants themselves, instead of to the
human actants behind them. In the case of corporations, funds,
and associations, this question has been answered in detail in
the positive law of most modern legal systems. To answer this
question with regard to pseudonyms, avatars, software agents,
or robots, we need to establish the conditions under which such
attribution solves problems without creating even greater ones.
Depending on how novel legal persons are introduced, they
could, in fact, destabilize familiar notions of responsibility that
form the moral core of the law, reinforcing undesirable affordances43 of an increasingly independent technological infrastructure. Instead of reinforcing independent actions of novel
technologies over which we have little control, one could also
seek protection in the law against what some would qualify as
a marginalization of human agency. In this article, we shall not
assume that technologies are either good or bad, rejecting both
techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. Nevertheless, we believe that the emerging proliferation of electronic agents and
other quasi-autonomous agents challenges the present legal
framework, requiring an in-depth study of the conditions for legal personhood in an information society. This will require the
40. LATOUR, supra note 23, at 71.
41. Id. See also id. at 52–54.
42. HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM, AN OPEN QUESTION 21(1995).
43. An affordance can be described as what is afforded by a particular
technological device or infrastructure. James J. Gibson, THE ECOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 127–43 (1979).
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development of a generic vocabulary that takes into account the
specificities of both the domain of computer science and of law.
In computer science an agent has been defined as:
A program that performs some information gathering or processing
task in the background. Typically, an agent is given a very small and
well-defined task.44

Importantly:
In computer science, there is a school of thought that believes that the
human mind essentially consists of thousands or millions of agents all
working in parallel. To produce real artificial intelligence, this school
holds, we should build computer systems that also contain many
agents and systems for arbitrating among the agents’ competing results.45

Interestingly, in law, an agent is often defined as:
A person authorized to act for and under the direction of another person when dealing with third parties. The person who appoints an
agent is called the principal. An agent can enter into binding agreements on the principal’s behalf and may even create liability for the
principal if the agent causes harm while carrying out his or her duties.46

What we see here is that both in computer science and in
law the concept of an agent refers to an entity that is at work
for somebody (or something) else. In both cases we have a principal that determines the objective, task, scope, means, restrictions, etc. of the agent that he employs. We will, therefore, refer
to electronic pseudonyms, avatars, software agents, and robots
that act or interact with others on behalf of their users/owners
as “computer agents.” In the present legal framework, a computer agent cannot play the role of a legal agent, because to be
a legal agent, the computer agent must have legal personhood;
so far, only natural persons, specific types of companies, associations, a trust fund, and public bodies have been attributed legal personhood. If a computer agent were to become a legal
agent, it could conclude contracts in the name of the principal.
In case the agent lacks proper authority of the principal or the
principal is non-existent, the contracting partner would be able
to sue the agent for breach of contract. One could imagine a restricted kind of legal personhood for computer agents, enabling

44. Agent
–
Webopedia
Computer
Dictionary,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/agent.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
45. Id.
46. Definition of Agent – Nolo’s Free Dictionary of Law Terms and Legal
Definitions, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/agent-term.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2009).
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both the user/owner and those interacting with these agents
more leeway in the handling of their affairs. Insofar as the interactions initiated by computer agents cause serious harm, we
may want to sustain the possibility to attribute legal responsibility for wrongfulness and mens rea to actants capable of reflection and intentional action. The notion of calling a person to
account for her actions seems to fall flat on its face if applied to
contemporary computer agents, and this is one of the issues we
will investigate in the following section.
In ethics and philosophy, agency is a term reserved for the
capability of a person to have intentions and to make conscious
deliberate choices on the basis of a moral and/or pragmatic
judgment about what is at stake.47 Even if it makes sense to
argue that non-human entities act and make a difference, this
is not meant to suggest that they act on the basis of conscious
reflection. Insofar as legal liability builds on this notion of
agency, we need to inquire further into the nature of computer
agents and decide whether and when they qualify for such
agency.
Personhood is not equivalent with agency, though it is obviously related. Again, in different domains, personhood has
different meanings. In computer games a persona is equivalent
to an avatar, while in legal theory a persona is often described
as the mask of legal personhood that allows an entity to act in
law, while protecting the physical person or other entity behind
the mask from being equated with its legal role.48 The similarity between a persona/avatar and a legal person can be found in
the fact that both refer to a role instead of the entirety of a
physical entity. This, however, does not imply that the usage of
the term is similar in other ways. An avatar/persona is created

47. For an overview of the intricacies of the concept of agency in law and
moral philosophy, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, search results for
“Agency,” http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=agency (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
48. This double function of legal personhood has been further developed in
the relational conception of law that sees law in a constitutional democracy as
always both instrumental for societal order and protective of individual freedom and the freedom to resist dominant frames of interpretation. See R.
FOQUÉ AND A. C. 'T HART, INSTRUMENTALITEIT EN RECHTSBESCHERMING:
GRONDSLAGEN VAN EEN STRAFRECHTELIJKE (1990); S. Gutwirth, Waarheidsaanspraken in recht en rechtswetenschap, Brussel: VUB-press and MAKLU
(1993); Mireille Hildebrandt, Trial and “Fair Trial”: From Peer to Subject to
Citizen, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL 215–37 (Anthony Duff et al.eds., 2006).
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in order to play in a virtual game or roam about in a virtual
world; contrary to a legal persona it is not created to provide
legal rights and obligations that allow for legal certainty and
legal equality. Legal personhood attributes a specific type of
personhood to an entity. This notion of legal personhood is related to agency because it enables an entity to act (in law),
meaning that the law attributes legal consequences to the actions of the entity. So, if agency refers to an entity’s capacity to
act, to make a difference, legal personhood refers to the fact
that this difference generates legal consequences. However, insofar as the law attributes liability for wrongful actions committed with mens rea, another notion of personhood is at stake.
This notion of personhood relates to an ethical and philosophical notion of agency that refers to the capacity to act in the
sense of intentional meaningful action. Such personhood suggests a sense of self, a capability of standing trial, that is, of being called to account for one’s actions.
One of the pertinent issues that is at stake in this article is
the question when legal personhood should be attributed to entities devoid of agency in the ethical and philosophical sense of
being capable of intentional action. The problem with the attribution of legal personhood to such entities (animals, ships,
trust funds, organizations) is threefold. First, in a court of law
they will always have to be represented by entities with agency
(at this point in time that means they need representation by
human beings). Second, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish liability for intentional wrong-doing or criminal guilt in
the case of an entity without such agency, which usually means
that in those cases the liability of other legal subjects (with
such agency) needs to be established.49 Third, the attribution of
legal personhood could entail an appeal to human rights on behalf of the novel legal person, which would be problematic if
this entity is not capable of self-reflection.
B. AUTOMATIC, AUTONOMIC, AND AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
At this point, it is important to make some conceptual distinctions between different levels of automation and autonomy.
49. For an interesting brainstorm on the legal personhood of personae
without agency, see Posting of Bob Blakley to Burton Group Blogs: Identity
and
Privacy,
http://identityblog.burtongroup.com/bgidps/2006/11/the_limited_lia.html (Nov.
17,
2006);
Chris
Swan’s
Weblog,
Persona,
http://thestateofme.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/persona/ (Jan. 9, 2008).
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For this purpose, we will distinguish between automatic, autonomic, and autonomous agents. Automatic agents refer to the
traditional association of automation with mechanical, noncreative applications that perform one or more actions automatically, i.e. in a predefined manner. In software programs,
automation builds on the application of an algorithm that defines the behavior of the program. Autonomic agents refer to
some of the entities discussed above that have the capacity to
initiate a change in their own program in order to better
achieve a certain goal. The program’s actions are not entirely
predictable, not defined in a closed manner and can thus be
said to be underdetermined. Autonomic behavior does not entail consciousness or self-consciousness. Autonomous agents refer to those having the capacity to determine their own objectives as well as the rules and principles that guide their
interactions. Auto (Greek for self) and Nomos (Greek for law)
refers to an entity capable of living up to its own law. An autonomous agent in this sense is an agent in the traditional ethical
and philosophical sense of the term, requiring both consciousness and self-consciousness, i.e., the capacity to reflect upon
one’s actions and to engage in intentional action. Selfconsciousness as the precondition for autonomous action is typical of human agency. So far, machines have not developed consciousness,50 let alone self-consciousness,51 while animals with
a central nervous system do have consciousness but lack the
type of self-consciousness that enables reflection and deliberation.52 Such self-consciousness depends, among other things, on
50. In the cognitive sciences, there is a lively debate over whether machine consciousness is possible, how we could design it, and how we could
detect it. Leading AI philosophers like Daniel Dennett, who endorse a computationalist understanding of the human mind, see no inherent obstructions to
assume machine consciousness is possible, whereas other philosophers within
the field of cognitive sciences, like Searle, take a more prudent approach. For
an overview, see MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS (Owen Holland ed., 2003).
51. Note that some philosophers, notably Dennett, argue that selfconsciousness—if not consciousness itself—is an illusion. This raises the question of the relationship between first person experience and scientific inquiry.
For a collection of essays discussing this and other related issues see
PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (David Woodruff Smith & Amie
L. Thomasson eds., Oxford University Press 2005).
52. For a discussion regarding whether there is continuity or discontinuity between humans and other animals in this respect, see generally Tobias
Cheung, The Language Monopoly: Plessner on Apes, Humans and Expressions,
Frans De Wall, GOOD
26 LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATION 316 (2006);
NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND OTHER
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the externalization and constitution of thoughts by means of
symbolic language. Although at present self-conscious machines do not exist, we cannot be sure whether – and if so,
when – machines will develop the type of self-consciousness
that allows for autonomous action.
IV. REVIEWING THE LITERATURE: ATTRIBUTING
LEGAL PERSONHOOD?
Legal personhood indicates the capability to be a subject of
rights and duties. Within the present legal framework all humans have been attributed legal personhood. It is granted by
Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
194853 and Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights of 196654 to all (living)55 human beings.
The drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) did not provide a similar clause, as they held it to be
too trivial and self-evident to include a provision on legal personhood of humans. 56
All Western legal systems grant legal personhood not only
to humans, but also to what is called legal persons. Those are
legal entities such as associations of persons, a trust, or even a
ship that can act in law as if they were a single person. To protect trade from incapable or fraudulently acting entities, stringent requirements usually apply with regard to publicity of the
incorporation act, encompassing mandatory requirements as to
formal registration procedures in public registers and mostly
some kind of minimum capitalization.57 This kind of legal personhood, as opposed to the legal personhood of humans, is not

ANIMALS (1996).
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI),
U.N.
Doc.
A/6316
(Dec.
16,
1966),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
55. For a comparison of the fuzzy borderline at the very beginning of life
in German, English, American, French, and Spanish law, see J.T. MAHR, DER
BEGINN DER RECHTSFÄHIGKEIT UND DIE ZIVILRECHTLICHE STELLUNG
UNGEBORENEN LEBENS: EINE RECHTS VERGLEICHENDE BETRACHTUNG (2006).
56. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I2889-English.pdf.
57. For an example of such requirements for business corporations, see
MINN. STAT. § 302A (2009).
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attributed by means of international treaties, but rather determined by national law.
Within legal philosophy, moral personhood is often seen as
precondition for legal personhood, building on French’s seminal
article on the moral personhood of corporations.58 French discusses why conglomerates, like corporations, should be treated
as full moral persons, whereas aggregates, such as lynch mobs,
do not qualify as such.59 French distinguishes between metaphysical, moral, and legal persons, pointing out that for many
authors legal personhood depends on metaphysical and/or moral personhood. Obviously, current positive law does not agree
with this position, since no serious argument can be made that
a ship or a trust fund is either a metaphysical or a moral person. We therefore refer to the idea that legal personhood is attributed to enable an entity to act in law (e.g., to create legal
consequences) and to be held accountable for its actions, while
also protecting the entity itself from being equated with the
role it plays. Currently, all entities besides humans and those
legal persons recognized by law are considered to be legal objects. This framework also applies to animals, which are
treated as objects of the rights of their owners in private law,
despite an ongoing movement by animal law activists.60
As computer agents operate at increasing distance from
their owners, resulting in an accountability gap, various authors have discussed the question whether new entities could
or should also be attributed legal personhood. If companies and
associations can be legal persons, why not software agents, as
well? In this section, we provide a review of what we consider
the most seminal published literature on this question in the

58. Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q.
207 (1979) (suggesting that qualifying an entity as a moral person does not
depend on positive law, whereas qualifying as a legal person obviously does).
59. See Raymond S. Pfeiffer, The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood, 9 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 473 (1990) (discussing French’s
argument and claiming it is flawed).
60. See Jane Goodall & Steven M. Wise, Are Chimpanzees Entitled to
Fundamental Legal Rights?, 3 Animal L. 61 (1997) (arguing that animals
should have the right to things such as bodily integrity and bodily liberty and
that such rights should not be denied simply because they have not been
granted in the past).For an historical overview of animal rights in continental
and common law systems, see Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 171 2002).
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past two decades.61
A. SETTING THE STAGE: SOLUM (1992)
In a ground-breaking article, Lawrence Solum discussed
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences.62 Though technological devices and infrastructures have developed dramatically
since he wrote his article, his comprehensive approach is equally relevant today, and we will follow his arguments to see how
they can inform us of the conditions under which and the extent to which it makes sense to attribute legal personhood to
automatic or autonomic devices or even to non-human autonomous persons.
Solum does not speak of computer agents but of artificial
intelligences (AIs). Apart from the pseudonyms, the computer
agents described above would qualify as an AI in Solum’s
terms. At the time he wrote his article, AI was at least as controversial as it is now.63 In speaking of AI, we do not take sides
in the debate of whether non-human intelligence is a contradictio in terminis. We will follow Solum’s pragmatic approach,
avoiding questions such as “whether artificial intelligence is
61. Note that much of this literature takes a common-law perspective, but
the arguments are usually sufficiently general to be valid for continental legal
traditions as well.
Within the scope of this article, we cannot go into all literature written on the
subject. We refer interested readers to additional views expressed in, inter
alia, D. Bourcier, De l'intelligence artificielle à la personne virtuelle: émergence
d'une entité juridique?, 49 DROIT ET SOCIÉTÉ 847 (2001); Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Electronic Agents and the Formation of Contracts, 9 INT’L J. OF L. AND
INFO. TECH. 204 (2001); R. George Wright The Pale Cast of Thought: on the
Legal Status of Sophisticated Androids, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 297 (2001); S. Chopra and L. White, Artificial Agents - Personhood in Law and Philosophy,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
635–39 (2004); W. Al-Majid, Electronic Agents and Legal Personality: Time to
Treat Them as Human Beings, in Proceedings of the 2007 Annual BILETA
Conference,
Hertfordshire,
16–17
April,
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Electronic%20Agents%20and
%20Legal% (last visited March 17, 2009).
62. Solum, supra note 3.
63. For a relevant discussion of subsequent paradigms in AI, see
FRANCISCO J. VARELA ET AL., THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND
HUMAN EXPERIENCE (1991) (arguing for the application of cognitive science to
human concerns regarding the body as both a lived, experiential structure and
as the vehicle for cognitive mechanisms), and KATHERINE N. HAYLES, HOW WE
BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND
INFORMATICS (1999) (describing the separation of information from its material form and investigating how such a phenomena can provide insights into the
fate of embodiment in technological based world).
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possible.” Instead of entering metaphysical debates about the
nature of intelligence, his essay “explores those questions
through a series of thought experiments that transform theoretical questions of whether artificial intelligence is possible into legal questions such as, “Could an artificial intelligence serve
as a trustee?”64 He suggests that translating questions about AI
in a concrete legal context will act as a pragmatic Occam’s razor,65 because the law allows us to detect the practical implications of providing legal personhood for smart technologies.
1. Personhood for Non-humans: A Legal Fiction?
Referring to John Chipman Gray’s The Nature and Sources
of the Law, written at the beginning of the 20th century, Solum
recounts the traditional idea that legal personhood for nonhumans involves a fiction unless the entity can be said to have
“intelligence” and “will.”66 In order to avoid controversial terms
like “will” and “intelligence,” Solum investigates whether an AI
could serve as a trustee (perform complex actions) or claim constitutional rights and liberties (assuming intentionality and
consciousness).
Solum thus redefines the conditions for legal personhood in
terms of the capacity to perform complex actions and/or the capacity to act intentionally and with (self-)consciousness.67 The
second capacity seems to comply with the traditional idea
shared by many lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists that personhood implies the capacity to act in a deliberate way. We

64. Solum, supra note 3, at 1232.
65. Occam’s razor is a “principle stated by William of Ockham (1285–
1347/49), a scholastic, that Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity.” The principle gives precedence to
simplicity; of two competing theories, the simplest explanation of an entity is
to be preferred. See Encyclopedia Britannica, Ockham’s Razor, available at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). Solum here refers to this principle because he wants to
avoid complicated metaphysical debates about what is “intelligence,” “agency,”
“personhood,” etc.
66. Solum, supra note 3, at 1238 n.26; John C. Gray, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed. 1921) (1909). See also French,
supra note 58 (discussing what types of corporate entities qualify for moral
and legal personhood).
67. We note that Solum does not discriminate between consciousness and
self-consciousness, often using the term “consciousness” to refer to selfconsciousness. As explained supra Part III.B on autonomic behavior and autonomous action, we think this to be a crucial difference.
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should note, however, that legal personhood is often attributed
to entities that do not qualify for such personhood. Legal theory
refers to this as a legal fiction: the law attributes personhood
though in “normal” life we would not think of the relevant entity as a person. Ironically, the traditional idea that legal personhood for non-humans is a legal fiction has been challenged
by Tom Allen and Robin Widdison.68 In fact, they claim that insofar as contracts are initiated, negotiated, and concluded by
autonomous computers,69 this attribution would imply a legal
fiction if the legal consequences of these actions were attributed
to the owners or users of these computers. Insofar as they are
not even aware of the contracts being concluded, it would be fictitious to pretend they concluded the contracts. This position is
not contrary to Solum’s. He argues for a pragmatic approach to
legal personhood: for him the question of whether we need legal
personhood is empirically dependent on the measure of independence of the artificial intelligence he discusses. Such independence depends on the capability to perform complex actions
(reducing the need for human intervention) and – in the case of
claiming constitutional rights and liberties – on the capability
to have conscious intentions.
In the next section, we will discuss whether an AI can
serve as a trustee (whether it has the capacity to perform complex actions), and in the following section we will discuss
whether AIs can claim constitutional rights and liberties (assuming intentionality and consciousness). The discussion of AIs
acting as a trustee is relevant for the question of granting a restricted form of legal personhood to computer agents in order to
bridge the accountability gap in cases that do not depend on the
attribution of guilt or wrongfulness. The discussion of AIs
claiming constitutional rights and liberties is relevant for
granting full legal personhood, bridging the accountability gap
in the case of criminal liability for harm caused, and facing the
issue of whether this implies that these entities have fundamental (post)human rights.

68. Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 26 (1996).
69. Allen and Widdison speak of “autonomous” computers, whereas we
would qualify these computers as autonomic devices; cf. supra, Part III.B.
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2. Acting as a Trustee: The Capacity to Perform Complex
Actions
To test whether an AI could perform the type of complex
actions that are required for legal personhood, Solum describes
three stages ofexpert systems in the management of a trust.70
The first stage involves an expert system that advises a human
trustee to invest in publicly traded stocks, to pay the beneficiary monthly, and to fill in the forms for tax returns. The actual performance of day-to-day tasks is largely automated, but
the human trustee makes all the final decisions. The second
stage concerns an expert system that begins to outperform the
human trustee as an investor, leading the settler to decide to
include instructions in the terms of the trust to the effect that
the human trustee must follow the advice of the expert system.
The role of the human trustee diminishes and the number of
trusts that the expert system can handle increases exponentially. All routine interventions of the human trustee (e.g., in the
case she is frequently sued by a beneficiary) are taken over by
the expert system, producing letters that need only a signature
of the human trustee. The third stage begins when the settlor
decides to remove the human trustee because he wishes to save
money or because he does not trust the human not to embezzle
funds. This third stage begs the question: who owns the expert
system? If it were a legal person it could claim an ownership
right to the hardware and software that allow it to operate, but
since expert programs have no legal subjectivity under contemporary law, the hardware and software are probably owned by
another legal person, e.g., a company. Having introduced these
three stages, Solum raises the legal question: can an AI become

70. A trust is a legal instrument in common law. It is defined as ‘“a fiduciary relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the
title to property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the
benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). The trustee is the legal person who administers the trust (investing trust assets, and
so forth). The beneficiary is the person for whom the trust is maintained, for
example, the person who receives income from the trust. The settlor is the
person who establishes the trust. The terms of the trust are the directives to
the trustee in the document or instrument creating the trust. Solum, supra
note 3, at 1240. In the continental legal tradition the function of trust is performed by several institutions . The one Solum refers to might be closest to
that of a foundation.
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a legal person and function as a trustee.71 For the sake of the
argument, he assumes that the trust does not raise complex
moral or aesthetic issues and that it gives the trustee very little
discretion. He also assumes that the expert system can make
sound investments, take care of automatic payments, and recognize events such as the death of the beneficiary which require a change of action.72 He then pins down the issue to the
question of “whether the AI is competent to administer the
trust.” Against the idea that an AI could serve as a trustee, he
anticipates two objections: (1) the responsibility objection and
(2) the judgment objection.73
i. The Responsibility Objection
The thrust of the responsibility objection is that the expert
system could not compensate the trust and cannot be punished
if it violates legal obligations like the exercise of reasonable
skill and care in investing the trusts assets or if the expert system embezzles trust assets. Presently, the manufacturer of the
system can be held liable on the basis of product liability. Can
we imagine the system itself to be held liable? How could it
compensate for damages? Solum suggests the system could be
insured, but admits that civil liability for intentional wrongdoing or criminal liability is hard to imagine in the case of an
expert system.74 In response to the objection, Solum discusses
the reasons for punishment.75 He argues that if deterrence is
the reason for punishment, one could claim that since expert
systems can be designed in a way that makes it incapable of
stealing or embezzling, there is simply no need for punishment.
On the other hand, if desert or retribution is the reason for punishment, one could claim that non-human entities are not capable of the moral judgment that is required if one is to
attribute desert and retribution. Finally, if punishment is a
learning process, Solum cannot imagine which punitive action
could communicate censure to the program. He thus concludes
that using civil liability legal personhood for an expert system
could work for as far as the system can be insured for its liabili-

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Solum, supra note 3, at 1243.
Id. at 1243–44.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1245–48.
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ty.76 As to criminal liability or civil liability for intentional
wrongdoing, he finds that liability is hard to imagine.77
ii. The Judgment Objection
The thrust of the judgment objection is that an expert system will always consist of a complex system of rules, which
does not allow the system to make judgments in the sense of
exercising discretion. The objection is played out in three versions. First, it is argued that an AI cannot cope with a change
of legally relevant circumstances; second, it is argued that an
AI cannot make the moral choices it may encounter; and third,
it is argued that an AI cannot make some of the legal choices it
will face.78 In all three versions, the problem is that, even in the
case of parallel distributed algorithms, an expert system cannot
do anything but follow rules.79 As to the first argument, expert
systems seem to lack the kind of common sense needed to solve
unexpected problems. As to the second argument, expert systems seem to lack the sense of fairness that is warranted when
unexpected circumstances require overruling the letter of a rule
in order to serve its purpose. As to the third argument, expert
systems seem to lack the ability to take the necessary action if
called to account in a court of law.80 Solum concludes that AIs
presently do not have the capacity to perform the duties of a
trustee, especially in the case of unexpected circumstances affecting the trust.81 He raises the question whether a more limited form of legal personhood could be designed, allowing an
AI to serve as a limited purpose trustee and/or for simple trusts
whose operation can be fully automatic.82 In that case, the
terms of the trust will need to specify a human take-over whenever unanticipated circumstances rule out automatic behavior.83 We note that Solum seems to restrict himself here to automatic devices. Where autonomic computing is concerned, it
seems that responsiveness to changed circumstances is part of
its definition: even if the system cannot but follow rules, it is
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1248.
See id.
Id. at 1248–49.
Id. at 1248.
See id. at 1249–51.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1253.
Id.
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supposed to be capable of adjusting the rules that determine its
performance. The first objection may thus fail in the case of autonomic devices. As to the third objection, this also applies to
corporations and funds to which legal personhood has been attributed. This leaves the second objection as the only real objection with regard to autonomic computer agents.
iii. Limited Personhood: Who is the Real Trustee?
In the case of limited personhood, the terms of the trust
could stipulate that a natural person should take over in case
discretionary judgment requiring normative evaluation is
needed. This raises the question of who is the real trustee in
such a situation.84 Why attribute limited personhood if in the
end the real decisions have to be taken by a delegated or substituted natural person? This objection can be read in two ways.
First, one can take it to mean that it is an essential quality of a
trustee to have the ability to make discretionary decisions. Alternatively, one can take it as implying that the ability to make
such decisions is just a practical corollary of trusteeship—
someone has to decide at some point on unforeseen issues.85 Solum rejects the first reading as unnecessarily “essentialist.”
The second reading, however, allows Solum to conclude that
the added value of providing a form of legal personhood to a
non-human stems from the fact that most decisions are routine
rather than discretionary, and it may seldom be necessary to go
back to a natural person for a discretionary decision, thus making the AI function as trustee for most practical purposes.86
Therefore, there is added value in economic terms: it may be
cheaper to employ an AI as a trustee whenever routine handling of affairs suffices, while the risk that an AI embezzles or
frauds is practically non-existent.87
3. Posthuman Rights and Liberties: The Capacity for
Intentional Action and (Self-)Consciousness
Next, Solum discusses whether an AI could claim constitutional rights and liberties,88 an issue closely related to the
question of autonomous action and agency in traditional ethical
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 1253–54.
Id. at 1254–55.
Id. at 1253–54.
Id. at 1256–79.
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and philosophical discourse. We will follow his argument as it
may clarify some of the issues raised in the previous sections.
We should keep in mind that Solum was writing at a moment
when autonomic computing was hardly dreamt of, whereas today it looms just across the horizon. The scenario on which Solum’s question builds is one of relatively independent artificial
agents that function as a kind of human-machine-interface
(HMI) that locates relevant information for a human person,
for instance in her professional life. Considering their computing power, they are capable of intelligent mining of a knowledge domain and of knowledge management far beyond the
reach of the human brain. As Solum writes, these HMIs seem
to have a “mind of their own.”89 He then advances the idea that
at some point in time these independent AIs could claim constitutional rights like free speech and the right not to be subject to
involuntary servitude, meaning they would resist being owned
by another person.
The question Solum wishes to raise is “whether we ought
to give an AI constitutional rights, in order to protect its personhood for the AI’s own sake.”90 We rephrase this question as
the issue of whether computer agents would qualify for a claim
to what we will call posthuman rights and liberties, suggesting
that at some point fundamental human rights like privacy, due
process, and bodily integrity may be claimed by and/or attributed to non-human agents. By calling them posthuman rights
and liberties, we refer to the existing category of human rights
and liberties; by calling them posthuman, we acknowledge that
they would apply, for instance, to non-biological machines, cyborgs, or synthetic biological entities, while also acknowledging
that this may require us to rethink the meaning of existing
human rights.91 Solum again raises three kinds of objections.
First, one could argue that only natural persons qualify for constitutional rights of personhood. Second, one could insist that
AIs lack some critical aspect of personhood. Third, one could
suggest that since AIs are human creations, they can never be

89. Id. at 1256.
90. Id. at 1258.
91. At this point we do not move into the discussion of whether such posthuman rights concern only first-generation (individual) rights or also secondgeneration (social) rights. We rather assume that a society of post-humans
may require further generations of fundamental rights.
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more than human property.92 Though it may seem cumbersome
to investigate these objections, we nevertheless take time to
explain them, as well as Solum’s response. We think that an
adequate answer to the question of whether computer agents
qualify for legal personhood will benefit from a serious consideration of these objections. To be sure, there may be more aspects that affect the question of whether full legal personhood
can be attributed. We should point out that Solum’s points regard neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for full legal
personhood, but any discussion of this matter must at least address the objections that Solum has put on the agenda.
i. The Natural Person Objection
Though one could claim that some constitutional rights
should be restricted to human persons, we must acknowledge
that specific constitutional rights (like the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause in the U.S. Bill of Rights)
already apply to non-human legal persons, while corporations
also have a right to freedom of expression.93 The objection,
however, maintains that, in those cases, the non-human legal
person is no more than a place-holder for the rights of natural
persons.94 A more fundamental argument against constitutional rights for non-humans holds that the concept of person is intrinsically linked to humans. The idea is that, since nonhumans do not share our biological constitution, they cannot be
conceptualized as persons.95 Solum counters this point by arguing that the just because today we cannot imagine nonhumans to qualify for personhood, does not imply that, in the
future, AIs could not develop into non-biological entities that
are intelligent, conscious, and feeling in ways that change our
very concept of personhood.96 We add that the advent of cyborgs
and synthetic biology blurs the border between biological and
non-biological entities. Cyborgs, defined as humans enhanced
with implants that, for instance, change brain functioning,
seem to introduce a continuum between non-biological robots
and human-machine hybrids. Following Solum’s argument we
may expect non-biological embodiment, as well as cyborg em-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Solum, supra note 3, at 1258–79.
Id. at 1258–59.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
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bodiments, to provoke novel conceptions of personhood.97 Finally, socio-biological and utilitarian arguments that it is not in
our interest to grant constitutional personhood to AIs because
they may take over seem to miss the point: they assume that
moral obligations are only in play between humans. They ignore the fact that the ability of AIs to take over this would certainly not depend on us granting them any rights.98 If we build
machines that develop intelligence, consciousness, and feeling,
Solum seems to suggest, we take the risk of entering a new society of both human and non-human persons.
ii. The Missing-Something Objection
This argument basically evolves as follows: something (the
soul, consciousness, intentionality, feelings, interests, free
wills) is essential for personhood.99 As no AI can have this
“something,” the simple fact that a computer could simulate
having this something does not mean it actually does have it.
Since having this “something” determines humans as persons,
non-humans cannot be persons.100
Regarding the argument of non-humans not having a soul,
Solum explains that, insofar as this is a theological argument,
it cannot determine the attribution of legal personhood: in a
pluralist, society legal or political arguments need to be based
on public reason, i.e., reasons that people from all different religious or non-religious beliefs can accept.101 Insofar as the argument builds on a Cartesian duality between material causality and mental freedom, he finds it inextricably wound up in

97. Compare the cyborg sense of self, described in KEVIN WARWICK, I,
CYBORG 260, 264 (2002), and Kevin Warwick, Implants and Cyborgs: The Environment and the Self, in IDEM-IDENTITY AND IPSE-IDENTITY IN PROFILING
PRACTICES, 52-54 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/profiling/#c2468 (last visited Apr.
28, 2009).
98. Solum, supra note 3, at 1261.
99. What this “something” is has been debated ever since the AI community began to take seriously the objection that computation and manipulation
of symbols cannot explain human self-consciousness. See, e.g. VARELA ET AL.,
supra note 63; HAYLES, supra note 63. For interesting overviews, see Holland,
supra note 50, Woodruff Smith & Thomasson, supra note 51, and, seminally,
STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD, THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEBATE: FALSE
STARTS, REAL FOUNDATIONS (1988).
100. Solum, supra note 3, at 1262.
101. Id. at 1262–63.
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the pitfalls of an untenable dualism.102 Regarding the argument that non-humans are not capable of possessing consciousness, Solum explains that if AIs are in fact incapable of
having self-consciousness, they would not be capable of experiencing their own lives as good or evil, nor could they develop
goals. According to Solum, goals, or ends, are a precondition for
being a right-holder.103 However, the question of whether AIs
are capable of developing self-consciousness is an empirical
question.104 Though at this moment consciousness seems restricted to biological beings, this in itself does not preclude the
possibility of non-biological consciousness.105 The empirical
question is complicated because a computer may simulate having consciousness, as a strategy to successfully claim constitutional rights, but this still does not rule out altogether that AIs
may one day convince us of their self-consciousness. We would
suggest that if AIs could in fact simulate consciousness as a
strategy to claim constitutional rights, one would be tempted to
infer that they have at least some kind of consciousness. Regarding the argument of non-humans not being capable of possessing intentionality, Solum explains that intentionality refers
to “meaning.” Just like a thermostat may seem to “know”
whether it is too hot or too cold in a room, an AI may seem to
know which stocks to buy. However, this “knowledge” does not
imply even the faintest idea of the meaning of hot and cold or
expensive and cheap.106 So far, AIs seems to excel in syntactics,
without having a clue as to the semantics of what they are
“doing.” The argument would be that as long as computers cannot give “meaning” to their own life, it makes no sense to
attribute constitutional rights.107 However, like in the case of
consciousness, Solum argues that we cannot preclude AIs from
developing meaning.108 Regarding the argument that non102. Id. at 1263.
103. Id. at 1264–65.
104. See id. at 1266.
105. See id. at 1265–66.
106. Id. at 1268.
107. Giving meaning to one’s life refers to the fact that humans are “symbolic” animals, whose cognition is mediated by natural language. This language has semantical, syntactical and pragmatic dimensions, whereas computer language is limited to a syntactical and (in the case of decision systems)
pragmatic dimension. A computer agent does not “understand” what it is
doing in the symbolic terms associated with the notion of “giving meaning to
one’s life.”
108. See Solum, supra note 3, at 1269.
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humans cannot possess feelings, Solum discusses the experience of emotions, desires, pleasures, and pain.109 Though he
has some doubts about whether personhood depends on having
feelings, he moves on to discuss what if emotions, pain, and
pleasure were to be essential for the attribution of personhood.110 The argument then develops similarly as in the case of
consciousness and intentionality: it may be that having feelings
depends on our biological constitution, but it may also be the
case that in the future AIs will develop feelings, though these
feelings will be embodied differently from ours. In that case, he
sees no reason to deny personhood for an AI.111 Regarding the
argument that non-humans cannot possess interests, defined
as an interest in the good life, Solum discusses the utilitarian
idea that the good life is defined as maximizing pleasures and
minimizing pain.112 In that case, the question of whether AIs
can have interests equates with the question of whether they
have feelings.113 However, if one takes a more objective and
public perspective on interests, like John Finnis does, for example, the question is whether an AI can flourish by including
goods such as “life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.”114 Solum
contends that, even if AIs will not have a life in the biological
sense, they might lay claim to a life in which goods like knowledge, play, friendship, etc. can be realized.115 Moreover, if living in a pluralist society implies that we accept alternative conceptions of the good life, we should make room for radically
different ways of conceptualizing the good life, for which the attribution of personhood is, in fact, a precondition.116 Regarding
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1270. Solum seems to agree with Kant that all rational beings
qualify for personhood, irrespective of whether they have feelings. He also refers to Aaron Sloman’s argument that any system with multiple goals requires
a control system, with emotions achieving just that in the case of human beings. This seems to be confirmed by research demonstrating that intelligent
people with brain-damage that reduces their capacity to be emotional can give
multiple arguments for any course of action but remain incapable of making
decisions.
111. See id. at 1271.
112. Id. at 1272.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1272 n.146 (citing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 85–90 (1980).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1272.
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the argument that non-humans cannot possess free wills,117 being the precondition for autonomous action, Solum explains
that insofar as AIs are merely an instrument to execute the
free will of a human being, they could not qualify for personhood.118 The argument thus focuses on the issue of whether an
AI could ever act beyond the instructions (the program) of the
human that designed it. Are the actions of an AI entirely mechanical, or could we imagine them as capable of conscious deliberation, reasoning, and planning?119 Again, this is an empirical question: we cannot preclude the possibility that AIs will
develop a mind of their own, capable of conscious reflection, deliberation, and planning. The fact that we could use a mechanical device to overrule an AI that does not obey our instructions,
would not be, by itself, an argument against the attribution of
personhood.120 It could be that this device is used precisely because the AI has developed its own reasons and plans. Such a
device would be like the discipline or punishment we exercise
over other human beings, depriving them of the exercise of
their free will rather than assuming they do not have free will
to begin with. We would like to add that autonomic computing
implies that the relevant digital agents act beyond the instructions or algorithms of their human designer or user. This, however, does not imply that they have self-consciousness and plan

117. Within the cognitive sciences some authors claim that ‘free will’ is an
illusion anyway. See, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS
WILL passim (2002). Though it seems obvious that much of our behavior is autonomic, this does not imply that there is no room for deliberate(d) action. In
fact it seems obvious that our tacit forms of behavior are often learned behavior, initiated by conscious deliberation with others. The discussion whether,
and to what extent, free will is an illusion relates to the issue of determinism
and voluntarism. Rather than embracing either of these extremes, we will
presume that human action is underdetermined due to its mediation by natural language that allows us to externalize our thoughts and reflect upon them.
This does not imply a mentalistic free will, nor a physicalist determinism; it
remains agnostic as to the actual extent of our freedom. It must be clear, however that to hold a person accountable on the basis of culpable and wrongful
action, a court must decide that this person has a measure of freedom to act
otherwise. If this is denied, the attribution of rights and liberties in law makes
no sense anyway.
118. Solum, supra note 3, at 1273.
119. Solum refers to the idea that human actions are not caused, meaning
that free will is not subject to the laws of causation. But he rejects this as an
implausible proposition, suggesting instead that “an action is free if it is
caused in the right way, through conscious reasoning and deliberation.” Id. at
1273.
120. Id. at 1274.
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or deliberate consciously about different courses of action. We
must discriminate between autonomic and autonomous action.
Both imply creative and partly unpredictable interactions, but
autonomic action does not imply self-consciousness or the capacity for reflection that is at stake in autonomous action.
Summing up, in the case of souls and interests, Solum argues that the pluralism of our society should prevent us from
imposing our own conceptions on spiritual matters or the good
life on emerging AIs. In the case of consciousness, intentionality, feelings, and free will, we should let empirical evidence decide the matter. As to the latter, Solum turns to the objection
that we may apply the Turing test to AIs and find that they behave as persons,121 while in fact they are only simulating.122 He
points out that to make the distinction between the simulation
of a person and the actual being of a person, behavioral evidence of great syntactical abilities would perhaps not be sufficient.123
iii. The Objection That AIs Should Be Property
This objection refers to Locke’s proposition that artifacts
that are the product of human labor are the property of those
who made them.124 For Locke, a human being is not made by
his parents, but by God, implying that a parent does not have
ultimate control over his children. Solum rejects this theological argument and asserts that we believe in personhood for all
human beings, even if they are made by their parents.125 The

121. The so-called Turing Test was proposed by Alan Turing in his paper
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950). Turing suggests
that if a person sitting behind a computer screen cannot detect the difference
between the answers generated by a digital computer and those of a human
person, this proves that the computer can think. For John Searle’s refutation
of the Turing Test, see John R. Searle, Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?, SCI. AM., Jan. 1990, at 26.
122. This is Searle’s Chinese Room argument, discussed by Solum, supra
note 3, at 1236–38. It concerns the fact that a computer makes its inferences
on the basis of syntactical correlations, without any semantic reference.
Though the inferences could allow the computer to pass the Turing test, this
would merely indicate that the computer can simulate a person, not that the
computer actually is one. To what extent a Turing test should be relevant as
evidence of personhood in a court of law is discussed id. at 1280.
123. Id. at 1276.
124. Id. at 1276 n. 159 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 285–302 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)).
125. Solum, supra note 3, at 1278.
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question is whether the fact that human beings are made naturally while AIs are made artificially should make a difference.
Solum believes the argument does not really add to the debate:
whether an AI should be granted constitutional rights depends
on it being a person and, if this is the case, an AI should not be
owned by another person.126 Moreover, even if AIs come into
the world as the property of their makers, like slaves, they can
emancipate and become free persons.127 Or, as artificial slaves,
“they might still be entitled to some measure of due process and
dignity.”128
4. Conclusion
Solum concludes that one could employ an intelligent, nonhuman system as a trustee, attributing it a measure of legal
personhood that fits the restricted capabilities of a system that
is capable of autonomic decision-making even if it does not “understand” the meaning of its decisions and does not have a goal
in life (and does not really have a “life” in our biologic sense of
the word).129 We think that his arguments are valid for computer agents like avatars, robots, and software programs that
function in a sufficiently autonomic way. In the following section, we will take a more detailed look into the legal intricacies
of the validity of and liability for contracting by (means of)
computer agents. Building on Solum’s discussion of constitutional rights for AIs, we think that, as long as the behavior of
computer agents is ultimately syntactical, based on correlations
that have no meaning because the system has no consciousness
of the world around it, we cannot grant posthuman rights and
liberties that presume the capability to reflect upon one’s actions, initiate intentional action, and take responsibility. For
the same reasons, it does not make sense to hold contemporary
computer agents liable on the basis of culpable and wrongful
action. We will return to this issue below, especially in the discussion of Teubner’s position.130

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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B. CONTRACTING AND LIMITED PERSONHOOD
1. Allen and Widdison (1996)
In 1996, Tom Allen and Robin Widdison investigated the
issue of the legal implications of digital contracting by computer systems that operate not just automatically but autonomously.131 They define autonomous machines as those that, first, can
learn through experience, second, modify the instructions in
their own programs, and third, devise new instructions.132 This
sounds very much like what IBM has recently coined “autonomic computing,” defined as self-management, self-configuration,
self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection.133 Allen and
Widdison anticipate that what we shall call autonomic agents
could be used for computer-generated, business-to-business
transactions on the internet, especially for discrete transactions
that are not performed in the framework of predetermined
trading relationships.134 They envisage that such “on the spot”
trading would encourage just-in-time ordering and stock control. They argue for adequate legal protection of such transactions, to ensure that the legal consequences can be affected, for
instance when it is unclear who is behind such autonomically
concluded contracts.135 One way to provide a legal infrastructure that generates reliable agreements could be to register autonomic electronic agents that initiate, negotiate, and conclude
contracts for a company, as agents for the company in a public
register.136 This would enable contracting parties to locate the
responsible (legal) person behind the agent.
Allen and Widdison discuss four ways of dealing with autonomic agents that initiate, negotiate and conclude contracts:
first, modifying contract doctrine; second, seeing the computer
as a tool of communication; third, in the traditional analysis,
denying validity to transactions generated by autonomous
computers; or fourth, conferring legal personality to computers.137 We note that their usage of the term “computers” seems
131. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68.
132. Id. at 27.
133. See Jeffrey O. Kephart & David M. Chess, The Vision of Autonomic
Computing, 36 COMPUTER 41, 42–43 (2003).
134. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68, at 28.
135. See id. at 29.
136. Id. at 42.
137. Id. at 43.

534

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 11:2

a bit awkward, as they are basically referring to interconnected
systems rather than single computers. For this reason, we will
discuss their suggestions as relating to autonomic computer
agents, which will typically be interconnected systems.
i. Modifying Contract Doctrine
As to the first option of modifying the contract doctrine, the
authors find that relaxing the requirement of intentionality in
contract-making could solve the problem of computer-generated
contracts. They say, “[T]he court would hold that the human
trader’s generalized and indirect intention to be bound by computer-generated agreements is sufficient to render the agreements legally binding.”138 This would fit well with the fact that
the “real” intentions of a contracting party will always remain
virtual: they will be read into the concrete interactions that
lead others to trust the party’s intention.139 We should remember, however, that the human parties that are bound by the
contract may not know the exact terms of the contract and often not even be aware of the contract being concluded. The entire legal framework of offer and acceptance is conducted
through machine-to-machine communication.140
ii. The Computer As a Tool of Communication
The authors argue that the second option of treating computers as a tool of communication creates a legal fiction when
used for autonomic agents. The agents are regarded as if they
are a mere instrument in the hands of the contracting parties,
while, in fact, they interact autonomically. They remark that
unexpected and unreasonable contractual obligations could

138. Id. at 44.
139. Id.
140. This is the difference between what has been coined as “Ambient Law”
in D7.9: A VISION OF AMBIENT LAW 1 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops
eds.,
2007),
available
at
http://www.fidis.net/resources/deliverables/profiling/#c1989 and Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 175 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008). Ambient Law would imply that a
legal norm is articulated into a technology, which means that the legislator is
aware of the affordances of the technology and also requires that if legal consequences are attributed to the violation of a norm, this is made contestable in
a court of law. Replacing a legal by a technological framework is something
altogether different, and could easily enforce norms in a way that places them
outside the reach of the legal and constitutional framework.
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arise by which the parties would nevertheless be bound.141 If
the agents could be regarded as legal agents, courts could use
the legal doctrine of actual and ostensible agency to mitigate
the legal obligations.
Actual agency is defined as: “the agency that exists when
an agent is in fact employed by a principal.”142 Ostensible or
apparent agency is defined as:
agency by estoppel: an agency that is not created as an actual agency
by a principal and an agent but that is imposed by law when a principal acts in such a way as to lead a third party to reasonably believe
that another is the principal’s agent and the third party is injured by
relying on and acting in accordance with that belief[.] A principal has
a duty to correct a third party’s mistaken belief in an agent’s authority to act on the principal’s behalf. If the principal could have corrected
the misunderstanding but failed to do so, he or she is estopped from
denying the existence of the agency and is bound by the agent’s acts
in dealing with the third party. 143

We should note that for ostensible agency an action is required by the principal; she cannot be bound to a third party if
there is no action of the principal that leads a third party to
reasonably believe that the alleged agent is an actual agent.
Should the principal, however, decide to pull the contract towards herself by means of ratification, she will be bound by the
contract.
Another important part of the law of agency that is relevant here is the doctrine of disclosed and undisclosed agency:
Continental European laws restrict the application of agency rules to
cases where the agent acts openly in another’s name. Thus, French
jurists infer from article 1984 of their Civil Code, according to which
agency is the act of the agent pour le mandant et en son nom (“for and
on behalf of the principal”), the negative conclusion that in case an
agent does not disclose that he is acting as an agent for a principal,
the consequences touch only the “agent” himself. The hidden principal
is not concerned by the effects of the transaction at all. Section 164 of
the West [sic] German Civil Code expressly provides that “an agent,
who acts without disclosing the fact that he is acting as agent, is the
only one to acquire any rights and is exclusively personally liable.”
In contrast to the continental view, when an agent contracts in his
own name without disclosing his principal, the common law allows
the undisclosed principal under certain conditions to sue or be sued
by the third party. Such conditions include that the agent had power
to make the contract and that the parties eventually learn their re-

141. Allen & Widdison, supra note 68, at 46.
142. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW 18 (1996).
143. Id.
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spective identities. This wider concept of agency has no counterpart in
continental legal tradition.
The use of this basic doctrine in the common-law countries gives rise
to questions regarding the identity of the undisclosed principal, the
election of remedies that must be made by the third party, the extent
of the respective liabilities, the right of the third party to setoff (the
amount of its own damages from any sum that might be awarded it),
etc. A solution to these conflicts of interests must in final analysis rest
upon an evaluation of the extent to which the relationship between
the undisclosed principal and the agent should influence the contract
made by the agent with a third party. 144

The categories of disclosed and undisclosed agency seems
highly relevant for our subject, and we should take into account
what it affords in the case of attributing legal personhood to
electronic agents or multi-agent-systems (MASs).
iii. Denying Validity to Transactions Generated by
Autonomous Computers
As to the third option of denying validity to transactions
generated by autonomous computers, the authors point out
that, as current doctrine demands human intention, the actions
of autonomic digital agents could not lead to a valid contract.
By not relaxing this requirement (as under the first option),
human parties would not be obligated by the contracts concluded by their autonomic agents. The authors indicate that the
enforceability of an automatically generated contract would become dependent upon whether the agent was an autonomic
agent, while in fact this may not always be apparent to the other party. This, in their opinion, would stifle commercial enterprise.
iv. Granting Legal Personhood
As to the fourth option of granting legal personhood, the
authors investigate the moral entitlement, the social reality,
and the legal expediency of legal personhood for autonomic
agents. They agree with Solum145 that a moral entitlement to
legal personhood would depend on them developing selfconsciousness. However, while they agree that at present no
sign of such self-consciousness has emerged, they find that the
legal system could still recognize the social fact of the indepen144. Agency
(law),
Encyclopædia
Britannica
Online,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/8976/agency (last accessed May 2,
2010).
145. See supra Part IV.A.
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dent actions of autonomic digital agents. Referring to Teubner,
they suggest that it makes sense to grant legal personhood to
entities that are capable of what we call autonomic action. The
point is not whether an agent understands the meaning of its
actions (which would require consciousness and allow for autonomous actions). The point is only that, since it is capable of
developing a trading strategy of its own, it makes sense to
make the agent responsible for such independent action. The
legal expediency of granting legal personhood resides in allowing the agent to act as a legal agent (which is not possible for
an entity without legal personhood), and to allow a contracting
party to identify the digital agent as the legal agent of a specific
company. They propose for companies to register their digital
autonomic agents in a public register, stating the competence
and limitation of liability.
2. Wettig and Zehendner (2003–2004)
Like Allen and Widdison, Wettig and Zehendner have discussed the legal implications of contracting by electronic
agents.146 Their analysis is much in line with Allen and Widdison’s, but because it is based on continental law and German
legal doctrine. They note that, in contrast to conventional software, electronic agents have characteristics like reactivity,
proactivity, adaptive behavior, mobility, and autonomy (which
they define as “the ability to operate without the direct intervention of humans or others, and . . . some kind of control over
their action and internal state.”).147
Noting that declaration of intent (DOI) is a key factor in
determining the legal status of a contract, Wettig and Zehendner distinguish between three forms of ICT-related declarations
of intent: electronic DOI, where the intent is communicated by
electronic means; automated DOI, where the intent are mechanically produced with the help of a computer program; and
computer declaration (Computererklärung), where the declaration of intent is electronically produced in a completely automatic way without being directly influenced by human action.
146. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25; Steffen Wettig
& Eberhard Zehendner, The Electronic Agent: A Legal Personality Under
German Law?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAW AND ELECTRONIC AGENTS
WORKSHOP 97–112 (A. Oskamp & E. Weitzenböck eds. 2003) [hereinafter
Wettig & Zehendner, The Electronic Agent].
147. Wettig & Zehendner, The Electronic Agent, supra note 146.
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The latter form can be seen as the declaration of what we call
autonomic agents. These declarations are usually seen as a
DOI of their user, comparing the agent to a vending machine
(selling automatically to anyone who happens to use the machine) or a working tool (where the declaration functions as a
signature in blank, without the user knowing the exact future
contents of the contract).148
The issue now is whether contracting activities by electronic agents can still be treated as “computer declarations” under
German law, especially as these agents become increasingly
autonomic. The traditional approach of German law ascribes
the intent of an electronic agent to a user. Particularly for mobile agents, with increasing spatial distance between principal
and agent, this approach becomes troublesome, as the principal
seems to have less direct influence over the agent. In a more
modern approach, authors have suggested various analogies to
ascribe legal personhood to electronic agents to solve this distance problem.” In this approach, three legal doctrines are applied to interpret electronic agents as having some form of legal
personhood under existing law. First, the agent could be a representative (Stellvertreter) who declares his own intent with
mandate of the principal; the problems here are that a representative needs to be a legal subject himself, which is problematic for electronic agents, and particularly that in case of false
representation, the electronic agent is liable (legal doctrine
supposing that the agent, not the alleged principal, is the contracting party) but cannot pay up by itself. Second, the agent
could be a messenger (Bote) conveying the DOI of its principal.
The problem here is that (autonomic) electronic agents do more
than just transport messages; they influence the terms of the
contract and are therefore not mere messengers. Third, the
electronic agent could function as a minor, with limited capacity to contract itself (beschränkt Geschäftsfähiger). Contrary to
minors who contract on their own behalf (e.g., buying ice
cream), however, electronic agents contract on their principal’s
behalf, and the regulations for contracting by minors are therefore ill-suited.149
148. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 120–22.
149. Id. at 123–26. At 127, the authors briefly reject an alternative “historic approach” of interpreting electronic agents as slaves under Roman law,
where the slaves can contract without having legal capacity, and their actions
being attributed to their master. Arguing that in current law, contractual capacity presumes legal capacity, Wettig and Zehendner thus dispose of the his-
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Since both the traditional and the modern approach inconveniently accommodate contracting by electronic agents under existing law, Wettig and Zehendner propose a “progressive
approach’” of changing the law: granting legal personhood, under certain conditions, to electronic agents. Besides the natural
person and the legal person, the electronic person (e-Person)
could be created. Following up on Allen and Widdison’s suggestion, Wittig and Zehender propose that companies register
their autonomic electronic agents in a public register, stating
the competence and limitation of liability. They write, “The result would be a kind of agent with limited liability (Ltd.
Agent).” For the party contracting with the agent, this approach has the advantage that they do not always have to trace
back the mobile agent to its distant principal, but can check the
agent’s solvency in the register. For the owner of the agent, the
advantage is that they can limit the agent’s liability, and, thus,
control the risk of using an autonomic agent over whose actions
the owner has relatively little direct influence. Introducing this
restricted form of legal personhood for electronic agents and a
register with limited liability does not preclude users from applying unregistered agents, but for such agents that lack the
restricted legal personhood, the actions would always be attributed to the owner.150 Of course, changing the law in this way
is only possible if an adequate definition can be given for electronic agents that are to have a claim to restricted legal personhood. Wettig and Zehendner point to the definitions of electronic agents in UETA, UCITA, and the Canadian UECA151 as
a good starting point for coining an acceptable definition.152
C. ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARDS FULL PERSONHOOD?
Whereas the previous section discussed the ways in which
Allen and Widdison and Wettig and Zehendner have followed
toric suggestion by Erich Schweighofer, Vorüberlegungen zu künstlichen Personen: autonome Roboter und intelligente Softwareagenten, in AUF DEM WEG
ZUR EPERSON: AKTUELLE FRAGESTELLUNGEN DER RECHTSINFORMATIK 45–54
(Erich Schweighofer ed. 2001).
150. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 127–29.
151. See UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION ACT § 2(6) (Nat’l Conference
of Comm’r on Unif. State Law 1999), UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTION ACT § 102(27), (Nat’l Conference of Comm’r on Unif. State Law
1999), CANADIAN UNIFORM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT § 2, ¶ 19 (Unif. Law
Conference of Canada 1999).
152. Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25, at 129–31.
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up on the first line in Solum’s analysis—new types of entities
acting as a trustee—we now turn to literature that builds upon
Solum’s second line: to what extent can new types of entities be
held accountable for moral wrongs and attributed rights and
duties?
1. Karnow (1996)
In 1996, Karnow investigated the issue of legal solutions
for harm caused by distributed artificial intelligences.153 His
major point is that, at this moment, we see emergent AIs that
operate in the real world with decision programs, making “decisions unforeseen by humans.”154 These unforeseen, and sometimes unforeseeable, decisions will at some point cause damage
or injury, and Karnow claims that this will lead to “insuperable
difficulties [which] are posed by the traditional tort system’s reliance on the essential element of causation.”155 He explains
that the complexity of digital systems “connotes multiple interacting but independent elements” making it “difficult, and
sometimes impossible, to predict the sum state of the complex
system.”156 As to search machines, Karnow anticipates that
even “‘classic expert’ systems that mechanically apply a series
of rules to well-defined fact patterns” (automatic agents, in our
terms) will not be able to mine relevant information, due to
persistent and exponential information growth.157 Instead,
what he calls “intelligent agent technology” will be responsible
for the searching of relevant databases and for deciding on relevant actions to be taken. His reference to intelligent agent
technology confirms Allen and Widdison’s discussion of what
we have called autonomic agents. Karnow claims that these
agent systems are relatively unpredictable, stating that “‘fixing’
these unpredictable systems to operate predictably will eviscerate and render them useless.”158 This suggest that “[t]rue creativity and autonomy require that the program truly makes its
own decisions, outside the bounds expressly contemplated by
153. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences,
11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (1996).
154. Id. at 148.
155. Id. at 148–49.
156. Id. at 149.
157. Id. at 152. Cf. JANNIS KALLINIKOS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
INFORMATION: INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 48–
75 (2006) (discussing the effects of information growth).
158. Karnow, supra note 153, at 154.
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either the human designers or users.”159
The problem with such unpredictability is that it generates
errors and faults, due to what Karnow calls “pathological decisions.”160 Such decisions are not something we can resolve by
writing better programs. On the contrary, Karnow claims that
“[t]hese are not ‘bugs’ in the programs, but are part of their essence.”161 He speaks of the fact that “the long-term operation of
complex systems entails a fundamental uncertainty” precisely
in the kind of complex and unpredictable environments that
require the input of autonomic agents.162 As these agents are
both mobile and distributed, they easily move outside the control of their user, and it becomes difficult to attribute causality
to either the physical person or company that is behind the
agent. But as these agents interact within a networked world,
it becomes equally impossible to attribute causality to a single
node within a network (as the node builds on connectivity) or to
the network as a whole. One of the reasons for this is that such
intelligent agents will often be polymorphous (difficult to identify as the same agent), while on top of that the boundaries of
the network are dynamic, raising similar difficulties of identification.
Liability in law requires causality—without a causal relationship, one simply cannot attribute liability. Even in the case
of strict liability, which forsakes traditional requirements like
intent or fault, negligence, recklessness, or other types of culpability, tort liability cannot do without proximate cause. The
concept of proximate cause is a typically legal notion, used to
discriminate between cause in fact (i.e., what continental lawyers would call the conditio sine qua non) and the legally relevant cause.163 The idea is that any event in real life has a mul159. Id. at 161. Cf. Giovanni Sartor, Agents in Cyberlaw, PROCEEDINGS OF
WORKSHOP ON THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC AGENTS (2002), available at
http://www.lea-online.net/publications/Sartor.pdf. Sartor remarks:
Note that the difficulty of anticipating the operations of the agent is
not a remediable fault, but it is a necessary consequence of the very
reason for using an agent: the need to approach complex environment
by decentralizing knowledge acquisition, processing and use. If the
user could forecast and predetermine the optimal behaviour in every
circumstance, there would be no need to use an agent (or, at least, an
intelligent agent).
160. Karnow, supra note 153, at 161.
161. Id. at 161.
162. Id. at 162.
163. Id. at 176–78.
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tiplicity of causes that overlap and intermingle, from distant in
time and space to relatively nearby or even concurrent causes.
To establish liability, one needs to single out an event that allows the imputation of responsibility for harm suffered, which
already limits the domain of possibly relevant causes to human
action (including omission or neglect), or at least to actions attributable to a legal person. To single out the relevant causation amongst the mass of causally relevant events, lawyers
speak of the proximate cause, which is often equated with a
cause that “brought about” harm that was “reasonably foreseeable.”164 The idea is that the (natural or legal) person that could
have foreseen the harm should have prevented it. For the same
reason, someone who caused an accident in the sense of “causation in fact” may be absolved in law from having caused the accident because of what is called an “intervening” or “superseding” cause that is deemed more relevant for the harm caused.165
Imagine that a person breaks the bike of a friend, which makes
him liable for the damage done to the property of his friend.
Not having the bike, his friend walks to the supermarket and
gets hit by a car. Though breaking the bike is a cause in fact of
the accident, courts will probably consider the collision with the
car to be an intervening cause. Karnow rightly explains that
what is “reasonably foreseeable” depends on custom and common sense, meaning that in a fast changing environment like
today’s, “reasonable foreseeability is a moving target.”166 This
keeps the legal system alert and responsive to societal developments.
Karnow then moves on to discuss causality in an environment with autonomic agents. His main point is that such an
environment will come to a point where the attribution of legal
causality (the establishment of proximate cause) does not make
sense anymore.167 The reason for this is that autonomic agents,
cooperating across a distributed network, will develop what he
calls “pathological decisions” next to routine and highly original, successful decisions. Such decisions are not always predictable, they are not a matter of preventable error or bugs in
the system, but part and parcel of the intelligence of the network. Karnow basically warns that we cannot have our cake

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 178.
Id. at 178–79.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
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and eat it too—autonomic agents will solve problems we could
not have solved ourselves, but this will also involve an “unpredictable pathology.”168 To attribute liability to any (human or
non-human) node in the network, or even to the network itself,
would create an arbitrary legal fiction that has no purpose in
the law: since nobody could have foreseen this decision, nobody
could have prevented it, so imputing causality or liability
makes no sense. As Karnow explains, “The notion of ‘proximate’
or ‘legal’ causation implies a court’s ability to select out on a
case-by-case basis the ‘responsible’ causes. But where damage
is done by an ensemble of concurrently active polymorphic intelligent agents, there is insufficient persistence of individual
identifiable agencies to allow this form of discrimination.”169
One way of dealing with this situation would be to ban autonomic agents altogether. One could imagine that the principle of precaution is at play here, requiring more research into
the potential consequences of harm caused by entities that
cannot be held responsible before introducing a technology with
irreversible consequences. Another option, chosen by Karnow,
is to abolish legal liability in such a case and to seek a technological solution for what he deems to be a technological problem.
Instead of hanging on to the traditional tort system and trying
to control the uncontrollable, Karnow proposes a Turing Registry.170 This Registry would enlist certified autonomic agents
that are insured against the risk of pathological decisions,
meaning that even when no proximate cause can be established
(thus excluding strict liability) the relevant agent is at least insured in order to compensate for damages.171 How this solves
the difficulties of identification of a polymorphous agent consisting of a network with unstable boundaries is not altogether
clear.
2. Teubner (2007)
Gunther Teubner makes the provocative argument that
“there is no compelling reason to restrict the attribution of action exclusively to humans and to social systems.”172 Teubner
168. Id. at 188.
169. Id. at 191.
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id. at 193–96.
172. For example, legal persons such as companies and states. Gunther
Teubner, Rights of Non-Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Ac-
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states that personifying other non-humans is a social reality
today and a political necessity for the future.173
Writing from a systems theory perspective, Teubner sees
attribution of personhood as a mechanism for social systems to
reduce uncertainty: viewing a complex entity as a person
enables you to communicate with it and to mutually establish
expectations. In fact, “through personification, the social system ‘parasitises’ the intrinsic dynamics of autonomous
processes in its environment.”174 Rather than focusing on ontological properties (like mind, soul, reflexive capacities, empathy) as a condition for personhood, an entity is considered an
“actor” and attributed personhood by its environment under the
minimum requirement of “double contingency.”175 This means
that in both directions of social interaction there is an element
of unpredictability. We can treat non-humans as persons if
there is “a resistance, a ‘recalcitrance’ which they [the nonhumans] exert and which cannot be overcome by existing scientific knowledge.”176 This seems to be the case with autonomic,
adaptable software agents whose actions cannot be predicted in
advance with sufficient precision by their owner or contracting
party. Contrary to Latour who, in Teubner’s account, seems to
argue that all kinds of natural objects that “modify a state of
affairs by making a difference” can be treated as “actants” in
this way,177 Teubner himself requires a “capacity for dealing
with proto-meaning”178 as a precondition for personhood, and
therefore considers adaptable software agents and domesticated animals as candidates for “actants” with personhood.179
Besides actants, Teubner also embraces Latour’s notion of
“hybrids, such as associations of human actors and non-human

tors in Politics and Law, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 497, 502 (2006).
173. Id. at 502–05.
174. Id. at 504.
175. Id. at 503–04.
176. Id. at 510.
177. For Latour’s position, see supra III.A.
178. Teubner, supra note 172, at 511. Teubner does not explain what he
means by “dealing with proto-meaning.” It probably indicates a certain capacity, in a functional sense, to “understand” communication with the environment, like a dog “understands” a command to lie down without actually knowing human language, or like an adaptable software agent “understands” that
its owner is interested in English Victorian novels after consecutive commands
to search for Austen, Eliot and Trollope.
179. Id.
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actants.180 Because some actants, like animals, lack certain
communicative skills, they can team up with human actors, for
example, animal-rights groups, to function as full-blown actors
in the social arena. These hybrids can now be personified as actors in their own right, under certain conditions. Although
Teubner does not give the example, we can imagine electronic
agents being employed by a company with limited liability as
such a hybrid. Rather than merely fitting the traditional model
of a legal person (the company with limited liability), it is the
hybrid of agents and company that should be the focus of our
attention, because this empowers electronic agents to maximize
their potential in the economic and social life.
The result of all this is that indeed non-humans gain access to social
communication, albeit in a rather indirect way. The law plays a special role in this game; it stabilizes non-human personality by granting
legal status to the hybrids via the construct of the juridical person, by
attributing to them the capacity to act, by giving them rights, burdening them with duties and making them liable in several forms of legal
responsibility.181

The attribution of legal status does not necessarily entail
“full-fledged legal subjectivity in order to open new political dynamics.”182 Different gradations of legal personhood and legal
capacity for action are possible, depending on the entity and
the social context. In the case of animal rights, basically defensive institutions will be created for legal protection (to preserve
ecology). In the case of electronic agents, however, legal personification, especially in economic and technological context,
“creates aggressive new action centers as basic productive institutions.”183 In other words, attributing legal personhood, under certain conditions, to electronic agents capable of dealing
with proto-meaning (adaptable, autonomic software agents), or
to hybrids of such agents and natural or legal persons, enables
them to act in an economic and technologically significant way.
3. Matthias (2007)
Another “plea for legal change,” as his subtitle emphasizes,
is given by Andreas Matthias,184 who has explored conditions

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 521.
Matthias, supra note 4.
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for legal, moral, and social personhood and applied these to
self-learning and self-adapting technology. He identifies an “accountability gap” (Verantwortungslücke):
[T]here exists a growing class of accidents caused by machines, where
the traditional ways of attributing responsibility are no longer compatible with our feeling of justice and the moral preconditions of society, since no-one has sufficient control over the actions of the machine, to be able to take responsibility.185

Autonomic agents—not only software agents, but also for
example unmanned aerial vehicles or digital pets—present
such an accountability gap, first, because they are unpredictable (unberechenbar) and, second, because they act outside the
“visibility horizon” of their maker, so that in case of failure, no
manual intervention is possible.186
Matthias articulates five cumulative conditions for the
ability to carry legal responsibility: intentionality, receptivity
and responsiveness to causes, having second-order desires, legal sanity, and ability to distinguish between intended and
merely foreseeable consequences of actions.187 If these conditions are fulfilled, someone can carry legal responsibility, in the
triple sense of having the capacity to perform legal acts
(Geschäftsfähigkeit), to be held guilty of crimes (Schuldfähigkeit) and to be held accountable for unlawful acts (Deliktfähigkeit).188
Interpreting the five conditions for legal responsibility in a
functional way, he argues that legal accountability could accrue
to certain classes of machines (software and/or hardware), perhaps not current ones, but those in the foreseeable future that
are even more self-learning and autonomic than today’s machines. Indeed, it is “only a matter of time before the distance
between the producer/operator and the acting machine will be
so large, that the absurdity will become obvious” of “transferring the accountability to the producer or operator (who is ever
less involved in the machine’s acts).”189 This confirms Allen and
Widdison’s point that not attributing legal personhood to these
machines is more of a legal fiction than providing for it would
be.190
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 46 et seq.
Id. at 63–72.
Id. at 113–14.
Allen & Widdison, supra note 68.
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Matthias observes that “persons” and “human beings”
should not be equated off-hand, since history and culture teach
us that many humans were (and sometimes are) not considered
by society or law as persons, and vice versa. Thus, Matthias’s
analysis warns us not to interpret criteria for personhood in an
anthropomorphic way, but functionally in terms of whether the
goals of legal accountability can be met. Machines can “learn”
and “be educated” (e.g., through neural networks that can incorporate legal decisions into their rule system), and they can
earn and administer money (since they perform economic tasks
and can learn to manage bank accounts) out of which damages
can be compensated. If autonomic machines are equipped with
such tools that enable them to learn, administer money, and
conclude insurance contracts, applying coercive powers (like
education or compensating damages) to machines is not at all
absurd, but often a natural extension of the original application
area of these powers that can fulfill the same goals as the legislature originally intended.191
Matthias even goes as far as to argue that the criminal
goals of special and general prevention as well as retribution
could be reached by “punishing” the machine. His analysis
here, however, is rather brief and less convincing than elsewhere.192 Altogether, the “plea for legal change” to hold machines legally accountable in order to stop the accountability
gap is more convincing where it concerns the capacity to perform contracts and to be held accountable, to a certain extent,
for tort. “Geschäftsfähige” and “deliktfähige” autonomic machines can in that sense be attributed legal personhood.

191. Matthias, supra note 4, at 239 et seq.
192. Id. at 247–49. For special and general prevention, he does not explain
how this would work with machines. As for retribution, Matthias argues that,
even if the machine does not observe retributive punishment as such, “the only
aspect important for the effectiveness of a retributive act is whether it makes
the original victim experience an adequate feeling of satisfaction,” and this
could in principle also be effected by “punishing” a machine. In our view, not
only is this difficult to operationalize in practice, but focusing on the concrete
victim’s feelings also does not fit in criminal legal theory of retribution. Id. at
249.
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V. CLARIFYING PERSONHOOD AND AGENCY AT
DIFFERENT LEVELS
A. DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERSONHOOD
It is helpful at this point to distinguish between various
types of personhood. Matthias makes a useful distinction between legal, moral, and social persons, with an increasing sense
of “personality.” That is, the widest class of persons is the legal
person, i.e., a bearer of legal responsibility, like natural persons
and juridical persons. They can contract and compensate for
damages and can also be the object of coercive or punitive
measures, in a utilitarian or functionalist sense. They do not
necessarily need to have a moral dimension. A narrower class
is the moral person, i.e., those legal persons that are responsive
to moral reasoning, like most human beings. They can be
praised or detested, rewarded or punished, and they are open to
moral guilt. The narrowest class of persons, in Matthias’s view,
is the social person, also called the natural or “full” person, i.e.,
the moral person who is socially accepted as a person. Most
human beings are social persons, but not always. It is culturally dependent just which human beings are fully accepted in society as “full” persons.193
We can extend Matthias’s categorization with the model of
virtual entities and abstract persons that has been developed in
the FIDIS project.194 An entity is “anything that has a distinct
existence; it is the fundamental ‘thing’ that can be identified.”
This includes physical entities (with some sort of physical constituency) and virtual entities, i.e., “an entity which is or has
been the product of the mind or imagination.”195 An abstract
person is “a virtual entity that can have rights, duties, obligations and/or responsibilities associated to it in a certain context.”196 These rights or duties are not necessarily legal rights
or duties. They can also be, for example, moral or technical in
nature. If they are legal, however, then the abstract person is
also a legal person in Matthias’s sense. The legal person can,
therefore, be seen as a subcategory of the category of abstract

193. Id. at 43–44.
194. Jaquet-Chiffelle, supra note 7. FIDIS stands for the Future of Identity
in the Information Society, an EU Funded research project. See www.fidis.net
(last visited May 11, 2010).
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id. at 35.
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persons, which again is a subcategory of the category of virtual
entities. This is illustrated in the following figure:

abstract or virtual entities
abstract or virtual persons
legal persons
moral persons
social
persons

Figure 1. Categories of Persons
One way of depicting the central issue of this article is illustrated with this figure: certain abstract entities, like pseudonyms, avatars, and software agents, operate sufficiently autonomically that they can be considered what some authors call
abstract persons. The question we have explored would then be
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whether they could “step up” one category and enter the more
inner circle of legal persons, or perhaps even, in the long term,
reach the category of moral or social persons.
Criteria for establishing legal personhood are not set in
stone, and there is no obvious consensus distinguishable in legal literature what precisely is constitutive for legal personhood.197 Some basics are clear, however, namely that personhood is associated with the legal capacity to act, and that this
capacity involves civil actions (such as contracting) and criminal actions (committing a crime). For personhood to be meaningful, that means that an entity should be capable of performing such actions and bearing the consequences of them,
which is particularly relevant when something goes wrong. It is
here that legal personhood can be split in two:
 legal persons who are capable of civil actions, such as
contracting, and who can bear consequences of civil
wrong-doing: compensate for damages in case of breach
of contract and tort; this may also include other unlawful but not morally wrong behavior, like misdemeanors198 and administrative offences;
 legal persons who are capable of all types of legal actions, and who can bear both civil and criminal responsibilities; this is the category of legal persons who are
also moral persons.
Thus, we can distinguish between a limited and a full
sense of legal personhood. What is considered constitutive for
these types of personhood may depend on one’s perspective on
the law, for example, whether one approaches the law from systems theory, functionalism, naturalism, or legal positivism.
B. DIFFERENT TYPES OF AGENCY
For the sake of clarification, we have introduced above conceptual distinctions, from a theoretical point of view, between
197. Cf. Matthias, supra note 4, at 46 (noting that many authors, while giving substantially varying criteria, each believe they have articulated the one
and only sufficient condition for legal personhood (often based on an anthropomorphic paradigm of personhood)).
198. Criminal offenses consist of crimes and misdemeanours. Crimes are
offenses that harm some fundamental value and thus can be considered as
morally wrong; misdemeanours are offenses that breach a rule that is not
primarily based on fundamental values but rather on creating order in society,
such as the rule that cars drive on the right or left side of the road, or that citizens must pay taxes.
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different levels of automation and autonomy: automatic, autonomic and autonomous entities.199 From a practical point of
view, these distinctions might become blurred and more difficult to assess in some specific situations. Indeed, we might observe some overlapping between these three types of automation and autonomy: for example, a software agent that is not
able to modify its own program in order to achieve a certain
goal is typically an automatic agent, but if its behavior appears
to be unpredictable anyway, which can easily occur with complex automatic agents, it can function in much the same way as
an autonomic agent. Probabilistic algorithms using an external
source of entropy can lead to fixed algorithms with unpredictable behavior: the program’s actions are not always predictable.
This creates almost a continuum between automatic and autonomic entities. The decision to qualify a particular entity as automatic or autonomic might eventually depend on an arbitrary
threshold.
The same is likely to happen with robots and cyborgs and
other enhanced humans. The limit between human beings and
machines might become fuzzy, creating a continuum too between autonomic and autonomous entities. When does a cyborg
stop being part of mankind, and would it lose its autonomous
property, when we replace, little by little, original parts of a
human being by artificial components?

199. See supra Part III.B.

software-agents

automatic
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threshold ?

Figure 2. The continuum between automatic, autonomic and autonomous entities
Imagine the extreme case of a cyborg consisting of a living
(enhanced) brain embodied in a robotical, artificial “body”.
What if moreover the control of this cyborg’s actions is distributed between its human (enhanced) brain and either internal
concurrent software agents or external computer programs?
Would this affect the measure of freedom assumed in the attribution of culpable and wrongful action?
Above, in relation to the “natural person objection”200 we
have already indicated that the clear distinction between biological and non-biological entities may become blurred with the
advent of cyborgs and synthetic biology. Even computers might
move from pure electronic components to biological or hybrid
ones. Research in biological computing is already a reality.201 If
we replace, step by step, artificial components of a computer or
a robot by human parts, when does it become a person that
could qualify as a human being?
The blurring of this distinction, however, does not imply
that it becomes irrelevant. It rather shows that distinctions are
analytical and usually do not map easily onto the flux of a fast
changing reality. The famous question of when a collection of
grains of sand counts as a heap comes to mind. In law, we know
that distinctions should not be made arbitrarily, since they will
generate legal consequences. The point is to acknowledge that
the difference between autonomic and autonomous action is
neither simply given in reality nor an arbitrary social construction. This decision implies legal consequences that have ethical
implications that need serious consideration if we wish to sustain fundamental (post)human rights that imply a measure of
reflection and the capacity for intentional action.
The distinction between automatic and autonomic behavior
on the one hand and autonomous action on the other hand, is
particularly relevant for the question when a computer agent
can be held liable for culpable and wrongful actions or can initiate an appeal to (post)human rights. As indicated above, the
200. See supra Part IV.A.3.
201. See,
e.g.
BBC
News,
Biological
Computer
Born,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/358822.stm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
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distinction is less, or maybe not at all, relevant for the question
whether a restricted form of legal personhood can be created
that allows the computer agent to act as a legal agent. We will
not try to provide an answer to these questions, building on insights from the literature review and the different types of personhood and agency that we have distinguished here.
VI. MEETING THE CHALLENGE: COMPUTER AGENTS AS
LEGAL PERSONS?
As we noted above,202 what is considered constitutive for
legal personhood depends on one’s perspective on the law, for
example, whether one looks at it from systems theory, functionalism, natural law, legal positivism, or from a relational conception of law.203 Regardless of one’s approach to the law, however, it is clear that emerging entities that operate at
increasing distance from their principal pose a challenge to the
law. This concerns first a challenge to determine the law, for instance, if an electronic agent, because of a software bug, buys a
camera outside his supposed pre-programmed money range, is
the contract null and void because of lack of intention to buy, or
is it valid and should the principal pay, and can he then address the producer, programmer, or seller to compensate for his
damages? Second, there is a challenge to enforce the law, because the distance between entity and principal, not only in the
physical sense, but also in the metaphoric sense that the entity’s action is not determined in detail by the principal’s action,
may make it hard to find the principal. Linking abstract persons’ actions in the information society to their principals may
require considerable effort, perhaps at a higher cost than the
damage at issue. The third challenge concerns the point at
which an autonomic agent develops a measure of autonomy
that implies the capacity of intentional action, based on a
measure of self-consciousness, even if this is hard to imagine
today. Such autonomy would raise the question of whether such
autonomous agents should have full standing in law, meaning
202. See supra Part V.A.
203. A relational theory of law emphasizes the instrumental as well as the
constitutive aspects of law as two sides of the same coin. This is a normative
position: the attribution of legal competence should always be instrumental as
well as protective. This position means that legal personhood should be attributed in a manner that protects the relevant human or non-human entities.
See supra note 48.
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that they can be called to account for criminal actions, while
they are entitled to what we now call human rights. Facing this
threefold challenge, the legal system has three potential
courses of action, which can be seen as consecutive in time, although the different stages may, of course, overlap at certain
points.
A. SHORT TERM: INTERPRETATION AND EXTENSION OF EXISTING
LAW
First, the actions of computer agents can be dealt with by
interpreting and extending existing law, incorporating the new
technical developments in the existing legal system. This is daily practice, and the law has an impressive tradition in construing ways to apply seemingly inapposite provisions to new
situations. To achieve the validity of contracts concluded by autonomic computers, the courts can qualify the general intention
of the owner/user of the computer agent as sufficient for the intention that is required for individual contracts, creating the
possibility for those who contracted with the computer agent to
sue the “principal” (note that since computer agents do not
have legal personality at this point in time, the legal relation of
principal and agent does not apply). This, however, will only
work if the electronic agent is considered a tool in the hands of
the owner/user, which is a legal fiction in as far as autonomic
computers may decide to conclude contracts in ways the “principal” cannot foresee with sufficient probability and which he
has relatively little power to control by giving precise orders.
Whereas viewing the autonomic agent as a tool could solve the
problem of the contracting party, it may thus create substantial
risks for the owner/user of this tool; and these risks could well
hamper widespread adoption of overall useful autonomic computer agents. Additionally, we must acknowledge that the contracting party’s problem will only be solved if, after tracing the
“principal” in the real world on the basis of the agent’s data
(which hopefully include correct identifying data of the principal), it pays to file suit against this “principal,” who may in fact
reside in another jurisdiction.
With today’s computer agents, considering a computer
agent as a tool nevertheless seems to work well enough for the
time being. For those authors who claim that referring to con-
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temporary computer agents as tools is a legal fiction,204 other
time-honored legal constructions within existing law may be
preferable to address the risks and accountability problems.
For example, rules can be, and in some jurisdictions have been,
drafted for electronic agents,205 stipulating under which conditions contracts are valid and who is liable for which actions of
agents. Also, someone intending to use a computer agent and
desiring to limit the risk of the agent acting unpredictably can
establish a corporation to serve as the principal for the electronic agent.
For tomorrow’s agents, however, applying and extending
existing doctrines in these ways may stretch legal interpretation to the point of breaking, when Matthias’s “accountability
gap”206 really emerges in practice.
B. MIDDLE TERM: LIMITED PERSONHOOD WITH STRICT LIABILITY
Creative interpretation and novel sector-specific rules provide for legal certainty, and they can also deviate from “off-line”
legal constructs, for example, limiting liability in order to stimulate the market for promising new technologies. However, at
some point it may make more sense to introduce strict liability
for electronic agents if their unpredictable actions are felt to be
too risky for business or consumers.
In line with this strategy, interesting solutions have been
suggested in the literature, notably to introduce a public register for agents, which could allow contractants to find the identity of an agent’s principal, or, alternatively, to lay a claim on insurance for damages in case a registered agent goes haywire.
The latter is similar to the establishment of victim funds, which
is a way for society to control risks involving not too high losses
for potentially many people, that are hard to attribute to individual causal actors.
A register of electronic agents might also be introduced together with a limited type of personhood for the electronic
agents at issue. That is, the electronic agent itself will be responsible for its contracts and potential mishaps (outside of the
moral or criminal sphere), based on strict liability. The agent
could have money itself, for example by earning a small provi204. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. supra note 151 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part V.A.
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sion for each transaction it makes for his principal, and use this
money (probably together with an insurance) to pay civil damages or administrative fines. It is currently not necessary to do
this, but being aware of on-going technological developments
that create more and more truly autonomic entities, we may
have to consider this option in the middle term. Of course, this
is not a trivial exercise. Some kind of procedure will have to be
developed for deciding which claims can be accepted, and which
court has jurisdiction if the agent or the claimant does not
agree. We also note Karnow’s warning that polymorphous mobile electronic agents may be hard to identify. In that case liability of the agent itself does not solve the problem and may actually create a problem in the case that the principal is not
liable because there is no way to locate the principal, or if the
principal can claim that he never gave reason to believe that
the transaction was concluded in its name.
Electronic agents are the most autonomic entities to date
and thus the most likely candidate for “stepping up” a category
to become a legal person, under certain conditions. However,
we should bear in mind that legal personhood has different
functions: it allows an entity to function smoothly in social and
economic interactions, and it provides it with legal protection.
Different contexts may lead to different forms and scopes of legal personhood. Pseudonyms functioning as an entity in themselves, for example, will likely not become as autonomic as electronic agents, but they may acquire a “personality” of their own
(like Mark Twain, for example, is a better-known personality
than his principal, Sam Clemens). The reputation gained by a
pseudonym may make it economically attractive to allow trade
of pseudonyms, or protection against defamation and slander in
order to protect their commercial value. Although this can likely be effected very well with current laws and legal constructions, it could be worth exploring whether pseudonyms, if they
indeed acquire an important societal function of their own,
could not be given limited legal personhood, rather like a ship
has been attributed legal personhood to solve the very complex
interactions that ships have in global sea trade.
Also, perhaps a case could be made for comparing avatars
to animals, and if the call for animal rights, often along with a
plea for legal personhood for animals, continues to increase,207

207. Cf. Teubner, supra note 172, with literature references.

KOOPS_MACROS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/10/2010 3:14 PM

BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

557

why could not avatars trigger a movement for avatar rights?208
After all, people sometimes become very attached to their avatars,209 and Tamagotchi and Paro210 are examples of technological pets that appeal to people’s emotions for their continued
existence. Perhaps avatars and pet robots will become as cuddly as panda bears, and the social need to protect them from
harm will lead legal scholars to argue for another type of limited legal personhood, in that they can defend themselves in
court; at first represented by human beings, like companies
are. But there seems no reason why, in principle, an avatar
could not be represented by a lawyer-avatar. Echoing Teubner’s
provocative conclusion of his analysis of the ecological movement (“Trees do have standing”),211 some scholar might, in
twenty year’s time, eloquently argue that, in the contemporary
technological world, avatars or technological pets are so vital
for social life that they need rights to legally protect them from
harm, like ecological systems today, and hence “avatar-human
hybrids do have standing.” The problem, however, remains that
since trees and animals are not capable of explaining their behavior in a court of law, granting them legal personhood seems
to be a categorical mistake. Whereas granting restricted personhood could in fact make sense as a means of piecemeal engineering, this is not Teubner’s ideal outcome. Though we appreciate the provocative nature of his preference for sweeping
statements, we think good reasons can be given against providing limited personhood for technological pets and criminal liability of animals.212
C. LONG TERM: FULL PERSONHOOD WITH “POSTHUMAN” RIGHTS
The constructions of limited legal personhood could evolve

208. Cf. PETS, People for the Ethical Treatment of Software,
http://www.elsop.com/wrc/humor/pets.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (parodying the animal-rights activist group PETA, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals).
209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part II.D.
211. Teubner, supra note 172, at 16; cf. Matthias, supra note 4, at 141–234.
212. Note that times have existed when animals were considered eminently capable of criminal liability. Teubner, supra note 172, at 497–98. Teubner
starts his article with a lively report of the rats of Autun, who were tried before an ecclesiastical court for eating and wantonly destroying barley crops in
the diocese. This took place in 1522. In modern legal systems, such trials seem
rather less fitting.
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into the third strategy, namely to change the law more fundamentally by attributing full personhood to new types of entities.
This would concern both liability on the basis of wrongful action and culpability and a lawful claim to posthuman rights.
Can we imagine that computer agents should be attributed
moral personhood in the long term, if they gain the ability to
make moral (or moral-looking) decisions, based on selfconsciousness (or something that looks to their environment
like self-consciousness)? It seems important to distinguish between the issue of what standard is used to determine who or
what qualifies for such full-fledged personhood and the issue of
how we intend to establish whether a specific entity actually
meets this criterion. We have argued that the relevant criterion
is the emergence of self-consciousness, since this allows us to
address an entity as a responsible agent, forcing it to reflect on
its actions as its own actions, which constitutes the precondition of intentional action. We note that intentional action, in
this view, is an emergent property of an agent who is responding to the act of being called to account.213 Evidently, autonomic
agents also respond to their environment, but they do not respond by developing a reflection on their own action (in the
German phrase: ‘Reflektion auf eigenes Tun’), even if they may
adapt their behavior to cope with changes in their environment.
Some authors may object that this conclusion depends on the
second issue, because the question is how we can establish that
autonomic agents do not reflect on their behavior. Some cognitive scientists could even doubt whether what we call selfreflective, intentional, and autonomous action is not after all
merely an epiphenomenon and an illusion of the brain.214 Although this in itself entails an interesting discussion, it seems
that, for law, the notion of an agent being capable of selfreflection and intentional action is crucial and does make a difference. For “posthuman rights” to make sense, we have to assume that autonomous action exists, even if it exists only as a
productive illusion.
We agree, then, with Solum that it makes no sense to exclude outright non-human entities from such rights and responsibilities. His point that such attribution should depend on

213. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF (2005); Mireille
Hildebrandt, Trial and “Fair Trial”: From Peer to Subject to Citizen, in THE
TRIAL ON TRIAL 2:15–37 (Anthony Duffet et al. eds., 2006).
214. See supra note 51. This point also relates to the Turing test.
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the empirical finding that novel types of entities develop some
kind of self-consciousness and become capable of intentional action seems reasonable, as long as we keep in mind that the
emergence of such entities will probably require us to rethink
notions of consciousness, self-consciousness and moral agency.
Should a form of conscious self-reflection surface, then this will
not necessarily be a property of a human-like robot (android),
but rather erupt from distributed multi-agents systems that
function as Karnow’s polymorphous mobile agents. The intelligence and creativity of non-human entities presently depends
on their interconnectedness, which allows for a measure of context awareness. In fact, cognitive science provides reasons to
believe that human identity itself emerges from distributed
brain processes, challenging the rationalist humanistic understanding of human agency. So, while non-human entities may
at some point in future have a claim to “posthuman” rights, our
self-understanding may also evolve to seeing ourselves likewise
as posthumans,215 because we can no longer think of humans in
the classic understanding of “us” as a rational, unified identity
that is transparent to itself.
VII. CONCLUSION
To decide whether a specific entity qualifies as a person
and the ensuing question of whether such artificial persons
should qualify as legal abstract persons, we could take a relative approach. This means that next to establishing the preconditions for personhood we should acknowledge different levels
of personhood, requiring different legal consequences. Thus, a
particular smart application could qualify for a restricted form
of legal personhood in as far as it can insure itself against liability; however, this should not imply the attribution of rights
that make no sense for an entity that has no consciousness, no
intentionality, no feelings, no independent goals and no capaci215. HAYLES, supra note 63. Note that the loss of this rationalist subject
does not, however, entail that we can no longer hold each other responsible,
since responsibility does not hinge upon sovereignty of the self. See BUTLER
supra note 213. On the relation between autonomic computing and human
agency, see M. HILDEBRANDT, Autonomic and Autonomous “Thinking” as Preconditions for Criminal Liability, in AUTONOMIC COMPUTING AND
TRANSFORMATIONS OF HUMAN AGENCY: PHILOSOPHERS OF LAW MEETING
PHILOSOPHERS OF TECHNOLOGY (M. Hildebrandt & A. Rouvroy eds.)
ROUTLEDGE (forthcoming); Cf. supra note 97 (describing the cyborg vision of
self).
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ty for autonomous action. Criminal liability, which presumes a
subject to be capable of autonomous action, had rather be attributed to another legal subject that does have this capability.
Thus, while a non-human legal subject would be liable for harm
caused in terms of private law, another legal subject would be
liable for the same harm in terms of criminal law. This other
legal subject could be a human being, a corporation or public
body with legal personality.
What should interest us here is whether the attribution of
a restricted legal personhood, involving certain civil rights and
duties, has added value in comparison with other legal solutions. For several scholars, it makes sense to ponder future
strategies to deal with new entities by attributing limited forms
of personhood,216 while others seem content with short-term interpretative solutions.217 A few scholars even go further and argue that non-human entities, eventually, can lay a claim to full
legal personhood.218 Others, however, try to circumvent having
to solve the legal problem of accountability by devising technical solutions that allow damages to be paid regardless of any determination of causation.219 Choosing between these positions
will depend largely on one’s outlook on law and technology, on
what constitutes a true “person,” and whether and to what extent the world is changing through the emergence of new types
of entities.
For the time being, our research questions can be answered
by the observation that interpretation and extension of the law
seem to work well enough with today’s computer agents. If
technology evolves and entities like pseudonyms, avatars, and
particularly electronic agents become more autonomic and acquire a “personality” of their own, however, it might be useful
to treat them as new entities with their own identities in themselves, with certain legal rights, duties, obligations, and/or responsibilities.220 The majority view in the literature is that

216. Solum, supra note 3; Allen & Widdison, supra note 68; Wettig & Zehendner, A Legal Analysis, supra note 25.
217. Cf. supra Part VI.A.
218. Matthias, supra note 4. Though perhaps the extent to which he advocates legal personhood is not entirely clear, see also Teubner, supra note 172.
219. Karnow, supra note 153.
220. Cf. F. Andrade et al., Contracting Agents: Legal Personality and Representation, 15 ARTIFICIAL INTELL. L. 357 (2007) (concluding that ultimately,
a “choice must be made between the fiction of considering agents[’] acts as deriving from human’s will and the endeavor of finding new ways of considering
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sooner or later, limited legal personhood with strict liability is a
good solution for solving the accountability gap, particularly in
contracting, and for electronic agents, this may be sooner rather than later. When it comes to attributing limited legal personhood involving rights to ensure legal protection, for example
to protect pseudonyms or avatars, the literature is considerably
more cautious; however, most literature to date tends to focus
on electronic agents rather than on newer types of entities like
pseudonyms, avatars, or pet robots, and perhaps the line of research on legal-protection rights for new types of entities has to
be more fully developed in the literature.
When it comes to attributing full legal personhood and
“posthuman” rights to new types of entities, the literature
seems to agree that this only makes sense if these entities develop self-consciousness. For the science-fiction-minded, it is interesting to speculate on a future where the independence of
new entities, like androids or distributed multi-agent networks,
reaches such a level that they move beyond autonomic-ness to a
measure of autonomy, so that we may even consider giving
them full legal personhood. But actually, this is a presumptuous statement. If networked machines begin to embody selfconsciousness, considering their potential advantages over our
own computing and acting capacities, it may well be their decision whether or not to grant us legal personhood. Let us hope
they will not treat us like we currently treat animals, as feed in
our bio-industry.221

the electronic devices[’] own will and responsibility.”).
221. This touches on debates around transhumanism. Cf. JOS DE MUL,
TRANSHUMANISM: THE CONVERGENCE OF EVOLUTION, HUMANISM, AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2002), available at http://www.filosofie-inbedrijf.com/uploadedFiles/Brand_information/Perspectives/Transhumanism%20
by%20Jos%20de%20Mul.pdf.

